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Abstract

For the past 50 years, the military’s use of space for our national defense has
increased exponentially. The use of space has increased so much that recent events have
led to the approval for most space Major Defense Acquisition Programs to fall under their
own process of oversight to track and monitor these programs. The largest reason for this
change is due to the difference in spending profiles and current acquisition regulations
that are not structured to meet these space expenditure plans. The key problem is no one
knows, for sure, how much the oversight process actually costs and if one form of
oversight is actually statistically better than the other. If the other processes are better,
what actually drives the cost for their oversight?
This thesis will provide a foundation and potential cost saving recommendations
that would benefit the Department of Defense in most of the acquisition programs it
monitors. The cost of oversight will be forecasted based on a panel of experts in the
field, using the Delphi Methodology. These costs will then compare with other oversight
processes for the Department of Defense Directive 5000 and the Command, Control,
Communication, and Intelligence new virtual process, to discover where the statistical
differences are in the cost of oversight. The total costs for all three oversight processes
will then provide insight on where the largest cost benefits appear to be, based on data
collected, and recommendations will develop a future track for the next generation of
oversight processes.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE COST OF OVERSIGHT
FOR THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACQUISITION
POLICY—A DELPHI METHOD APPROACH

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Overview
Space has been an important part of today’s military operations. It is hard to
imagine a military engagement in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM or
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM that did not involve military technologies in space.
From the collection of intelligence, the communication of information, the positioning of
ground troops, the target selection, the bomb positioning via global positioning guidance
systems, and the post impact analysis, space applications are involved in every step.
Moving into the future, space will be even more necessary to ensure the United States’
national security. Increases in the need for communication and intelligence satellites and
the need for the Ballistic Missile Defense System places additional stresses on an already
stretched budget. There is a need to make sure every dollar is being spent properly and
prudently.
With the creation of a new process for all space acquisition programs, there is
hope that the needed space systems will be procured cheaper and easier through a new
acquisition process. The process will decentralize the acquisition procurement process by
moving more decisions to the lower levels of government. The problem with the new
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oversight process is that no one knows if it actually saves money and if oversight is better
when it is centralized or decentralized.
This thesis will use the Delphi Method of forecasting to estimate the cost of
oversight for space acquisition in the new National Security Space Acquisition Policy
(NSSAP) 03-01. By using experts in the space acquisition field, an estimate of oversight
costs will be established and compared to other acquisition processes. The goal will be to
evaluate if the perception of new streamlining reforms are taking affect and benefiting the
acquisition oversight processes as well as identifying the five main cost drivers. The
struggle between centralized and decentralized oversight has lasted for the last 60 years,
and this thesis will provide insight to whether the streamlining efforts to decentralize the
current space acquisition procedures are being accepted by those using the new NSSAP
03-01 process.
Even prior to the Air Force’s existence, the oversight process has been a
constantly fluctuating process that moved from decentralization to centralization of
control and oversight. This chapter will introduce the background of the problem and
show how this research is needed in the National Security Space Acquisition
environment. This chapter will provide a brief history of current knowledge and will list
all assumptions for establishing the boundaries for the research.
1.2 Background
Twenty-one years prior to the creation of the Air Force, the oversight of
acquisition programs was left to the local level managers. In 1947, with the creation of
the Air Force, the first Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, established a
centralized procurement system (5:9). By changing the location of oversight approval
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authority, a precedent had been set that continues to be inherent in today’s acquisition
oversight process; the struggle for oversight control. For the next 56 years, the oversight
process changed from centralized to decentralized and back again 10 times; only 19
percent of the time was spent decentralized. The most recent change was to create a new
National Security Space Acquisition Policy that gives the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (DNRO)/Under Secretary of the Air Force (USecAF) the
decentralized control to make the key decisions. The new process decentralizes the
decision making process and potentially streamlines the approval process of space
programs going through major milestones in their program lifecycles. This step,
however, is just a potential round in the fight for oversight. To place the struggle
visually, Figure 1.1 shows the length of time the acquisition process has remained in the
decentralization model, starting in 1926. When the process is decentralized, the points
are at zero.
The Struggle of Decentralization
1
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Figure 1.1: The Struggle for Decentralization
If the decentralization of government actually provides cost savings, why is it that
the maximum time spent in decentralization, other than pre-World War II, is four years?
Does loosening centralized control make it easier and faster to procure weapon systems
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and does that outweigh the possible increased costs of fraud? Is there a perceived
difference in the actual cost of performing the oversight between the centralized, or
standard DoDD 5000.1, and the new National Security Space Acquisition Policy?
1.3 Problem
This research will answer three questions and provide insight to the answers of
those questions. There are three questions that will be addressed in the research.
1. According to experts in the field, what is the estimated cost of oversight for a
space acquisition program under the NSSAP 03-01 IPA oversight process?
2. How does the cost of oversight for space programs compare to the cost of
oversight for programs under the DoDD 5000 series and the virtual
acquisition processes?
3. What are the five main cost drivers for the oversight of space acquisition
programs?
The Key Decision Points (KDP) will be the primary measure for establishing
costs for oversight. These are the points in the acquisition program when a major
decision must be made to judge if a space system can move forward. For each KDP,
experienced people whom do not specifically have a major stake in the program being
reviewed must perform an Integrated Program Assessment (IPA). If the IPA finds,
through its independent review, that there is a problem, the program must either be fixed
prior to moving forward, or can move forward, with approval from the DNRO/USecAF,
with an approved plan for fixing the program. The IPA process occurs a minimum of
three times in a program’s life-cycle.
The IPA process is what will control the length of time the program spends in the
KDP. The process takes approximately 180 days, not including the initial start of the
Independent Cost Analysis/Estimate (ICA/E). Since this thesis will only cover the IPA
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process from day 10 forward to completion, the only part of the ICA/E covered are the
portions included in the standard IPA process.
1.4 Summary of Current Knowledge
Knowing that the process of decentralization has been fought for over 56 years,
the main focus now shifts to one distinct question: exactly why is the establishment of the
cost of the new oversight process so important? Over the past 56 years, with the
revisions of the acquisition process, whether it was centralized or decentralized, the
revision added or subtracted points in the oversight that cost or gained the program
because of the change in time for the decision. These results could have been positive or
negative, but no true comparison currently exists. For the DoDD 5000 series, the
oversight process is a series of decision points that must be met in order for that program
to progress through the acquisition lifecycle. In order to accomplish this, several
meetings with various stakeholders, members, and principal decision makers must occur.
There is normally a schedule produced with estimated completion dates set for each
meeting. In 1994, the Acquisition Reform Process Action Team estimated that it cost
$10-12 million dollars in oversight for a program to pass through one decision point
(17:9). This cost was taken over three programs and the exact nature of the programs
could not be ascertained. Since this dollar figure is nine years old, the figure will be
adjusted with average inflation rates in Chapter 2 to reflect current dollar amounts. This
does provide a comparative baseline when completing the analysis and the establishment
of the IPA cost of oversight.
In the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization (11), the Commission focused on the need to restructure
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the space acquisition process through the reorganization and decentralization of
oversight. The main reason for this reorganization is the differences between a normal
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and a Space MDAP. The normal system
prepares its lifecycle for an increased cost in the production and development cycle as
well as the operations and support cycles.

Figure 1.2: Milestone Decision Points for DoDD 5000.1 (33:14)
Addressing Figure 1.2, the points of interest are the triangles marked A, B, and C.
At these points are the major milestones when key decisions are made and the process of
oversight will be measured and compared. When this process is compared to the new
NSSAP, the differences caused by the nature of the acquisition and the differences in the
life cycles are immediately apparent.

Figure 1.3: National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 KDP (33:14)
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A review of the literature revealed several articles on the revisions and the history
of the acquisition process, with only one discovery that briefly mentioned the actual cost
of oversight, the Acquisition Reform Process Action Team (17), mentioned earlier.
Although these pieces of literature provide a historical perspective and allow the tracking
of the oversight process changes over time, it is the goal of this thesis to establish the
actual cost of the oversight process in the new NSSAP 03-01.
1.5 Assumptions
Several assumptions are relevant for the present research. First, one KDP will be
similar to the next. Since the process takes 180 days, only one process will be reviewed.
This assumption will allow for an easy calculation to equate to the entire program cost.
The next assumption is that the oversight process will be limited from the Program
Executive Officer to the Director/NRO. This will allow for a traceable medium in which
the time the Program Manager is spending in meetings for the IPA will be gathered. This
will also allow for smooth comparisons with the other forms of oversight when placed for
comparison. Another assumption for the comparative analysis is that the variances are all
equal. This will enable a simplistic comparison when conducting the analysis of variance
testing.
1.6 Scope
This research sets out to find the cost of oversight as perceived by those experts
extensively involved in the space acquisition process. The estimates will be obtained by
querying a panel of experts, who will remain anonymous, with questions that will
ultimately provide a group consensus on the cost of oversight to get one program through
one KDP. The panel of experts will be asked to estimate from the PEO to the final
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decision member, which is the USecAF, the cost of all meetings, support, temporary duty
costs, everything involved with the oversight to get a space program through an IPA with
an approval. The costs will be compared to a report filed in 1994 by the Acquisition
Reform Process Action Team (17), the DoDD 5000 series research, conducted by Captain
Gary Rousseau (40); and the C3I RIT (Virtual Process) research, conducted by Captain
Monroe Neal (32). The comparison will show if perception of the streamlining of the
acquisition oversight processes have been accepted fully by the respective acquisition
panel experts.
The process will not include anything below the PEO level and will not go higher
than the DNRO/USecAF. This will allow for a normalized comparison between the other
programs being researched by Captain Rousseau and Capt Neal. The oversight process
will be reviewed. This research will not include external influences on the oversight
process. These external influences are the budget, the requirements and generation
process, and other congressional/political processes that inherently affect programs and
their everyday oversight operations. The focus of this research is to establish an estimate
of the cost of oversight for the NSSAP 03-01. The goal is to set the framework and the
foundation for future research for the cost of oversight.
The research will stop once sufficient data has been collected from at least one
KDP going through the IPA process, as described in NSSAP 03-01. Once the framework
has been established, the research will conclude with the analysis of the results and the
conclusion of the findings. The possibility of future research on this topic is expected.
1.7 Standards
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Since this is a new direction in the research on oversight. With the list of
assumptions and the scope of the research, the goal will always be maintained: establish
the foundation for the cost of oversight for the NSSAP 03-01 acquisition IPAT KDP
process. The comparison with the 1994 Process Action Team will be necessary to equate
their cost figures to the cost figures gathered in this research. The comparison with the
research conducted by Captain Rousseau and Captain Neal will provide insight in testing
for differences among the separate acquisition processes.
1.8 Summary of Thesis
The collection of information is the most vital portion of the research. After
reviewing the proposal, the literature review will provide the background of the history of
oversight and the research conducted on the acquisition cycle. The third chapter will
provide the methodology for gathering data, the use of the Delphi method, and how the
research focus will be maintained. The fourth chapter will display the results of the
results from following the Delphi methodology and will lead to the fifth chapter where all
analysis will be completed and all comparisons will be made.
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2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Overview
As of 31 December 2002, there are 72 categorized major defense acquisition
programs (MDAPs) in the Department of Defense (DoD) (20). These programs currently
total over $1.12 trillion dollars of taxpayer’s money (20). Of these programs, seven are
considered space programs, not including the Ballistic Missile Defense Program (20).
These seven programs, as of December 2003, totaled $35.79 billion. Although these
programs constitute only three percent of the total programs listed in the Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR), recent changes place several of them under new oversight
guidance. These changes will alter the way all space programs are managed and tracked
in the future.
A literature search for background and pertinent information revealed limited
research on the actual cost of oversight for MDAPs. Several documents addressed
contract oversight, but only one touched on actual cost of oversight reviews. The
common theme found in the research uncovered a historical chronological struggle with
the centralization and decentralization of oversight on the acquisition process.
This chapter covers topics ranging from the beginning of Air Force acquisitions,
when space programs began, and the beginning of the Department of Defense Directive
(DoDD) 5000 and its reforms. It also contains a brief history of space acquisitions and
recognizing the need for change. The chapter will show the realigning of space
acquisitions and seeing if the new acquisition process really worked.
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2.2 The Beginning of the Air Force Acquisition Process
Prior to World War II, most defense acquisition processes were handled by the
Dayton, Ohio Air Corps’ Materiel Division. “Although some key decisions were made in
Washington, DC, the Materiel Division played a critical role in fostering the development
of American aviation…” (5:1). At that time, it was believed that most of the oversight
could be handled locally and that only during key decision times should Washington, DC
be involved. The remainder of the time, local leaders were expected to implement the
procedures for procuring weapons systems.
In 1941, the Materiel Division split. The Army created the Air Corps
Maintenance Command and in 1942, headquarters moved to Patterson Field (5:7).
Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E) became Materiel Command in
1942 and moved to Wright Field in 1943 (5:7). This move placed acquisitions and
logistics functions in practically the same location.
According to Benson, the move in 1943 created “confusion and duplication”
(5:7). In 1944 the two commands were merged to become the Army Air Force Air
Technical Service Command, and settled at Patterson Field, which was located only a
few blocks away from Wright Field. At this time “much of the authority over acquisition
matters remained in Washington” (5:7).
With the end of World War II and the creation of the Air Force in 1947, a
centralized procurement system was planned by the first Secretary of the Air Force,
Stuart Symington. The goal was “to perform three pair of core functions: (1) research
and development, (2) supply and maintenance, and (3) procurement and industrial
planning” (5:9). This decision created the Air Materiel Command.
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In the 1950s, the Research and Development Command was created at WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Ohio, which had merged earlier in 1948. It was developed
from existing infrastructure and missions. Later that same year, it was renamed the “Air
Research and Development Command (ARDC)…the new command moved its
headquarters to Baltimore, Maryland, in June 1951” (5:10). During this time, space was
starting to be explored as a new frontier for the United States. A new acquisition process
had to be initiated in order to maintain the security of the United States in the new space
environment and ensure that the weapon systems met the goals of the United States’
security policies.
2.3 Space Acquisition Programs Begin
From the beginning of space exploration in the 1950s to today, space programs
have followed the standard MDAP acquisition cycle. Only in cases of secret, or “black
world”, operations have there been any differences between the acquisition procedures of
the two. This section discusses the beginning of space program acquisitions for “open”
programs in the military. The “black world” operations will be discussed in a separate
section.
In the 1950s, a new organization designated the Weapon System Program Office
(WSPO) was created. “WSPOs pulled together members of ARDC, AMC, and (the)
operational command(s) who would use the system….WSPOs also maintained close
liaison with the contractors involved” (5:12). The use of the word “Weapon” in WSPO’s
indicated that all weapon systems would be included; missiles, aircraft, and new space
technologies. This weapons systems approach was based on a new acquisition strategy
called “concurrency” (5:12). With new threats of nuclear missiles placed in countries
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that could reach the United States, there was a need for intermediate range and
intercontinental ballistic missiles (IRBMs and ICBMs) and to acquire them as quick as
possible. The concurrency process enveloped all of the previous acquisition steps into
overlapped procedures carried out in a coordinated effort that was “reminiscent of the
streamlined procurement of World War II” (5:13). Additional problems, in this case,
included the need for the new technology and the uncertainty of space.
To address the uncertainty of space and to explore the space frontier, the Air
Force Ballistic Missile Division was created in 1957 (31:10). The Ballistic Missile
Division managed programs including the Thor IRBM and the WS-117L reconnaissance
satellite program. The Ballistic Missile Division had the luxury of funding priority after
the launch of the Soviet satellite “Sputnik” in 1957 (5:13). With this funding priority, the
Ballistic Missile Division developed and deployed missiles and subsystems, built launch
sites and support equipment, and trained crews; all simultaneously. “Although this
effort…led to cost overruns, extensive modifications, and unrealistic training, it truly
achieved the goal of giving the United States a ballistic missile deterrent as soon as
possible” (5:14).
In 1951, the test and evaluation portion of the acquisition process had split into
seven phases; in 1956, it increased to eight (5:14). The Air Force recognized the need to
cut the costs included with the extensive oversight process. In 1957, to “help expedite
production decisions” (5:14), the Air Proving Command was abolished and in 1958, the
eight-phase test portion was changed to a three-phase system.
In 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was
activated as a non-DoD agency for the peaceful exploration of space by the United States
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(27:11). With this new agency, the military was allowed to play an important support
role in scientific programs and offered several assets to the new agency.
In 1959, “Headquarters Air Force formed the Weapon Systems Management
Study Group” (5:15). The goal was to review the current acquisition cycles and the issue
of concurrency. The group reached compromises that resulted in the “better defining
authority at each stage of the acquisition strategy” (5:15). The group created a new series
of acquisition regulations and renamed the WSPO the System Program Office (SPO).
This movement “recognized the growing importance of C3, surveillance, and other
technologies that supported the war-fighter (5:15).
In 1961, there was “an offer the Air Force couldn’t refuse,” the control and
responsibility for military space programs. This control came with the condition that the
current acquisition process had to change to better handle the unique mission of space.
By 1963, however, the new oversight in the acquisition process had become burdensome.
“At the top was the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and its new requirements
for cost effectiveness data and disciplined programming and budgeting schedules” (5:16).
The oversight seemed to trickle down the process until it reached the contractor. The
new processes made programming and budgeting difficult and the new scope of the
programs “made cost predictions difficult and led to unrealistic bids” (5:16). Another
problem was the increased number of reports, audits, proposals, studies and the other
oversight items requested by OSD.
In 1969, after several cost overruns and under Congressional pressure, President
Nixon commissioned a round of acquisition reforms. Then Deputy Secretary of Defense,
David Packard, was chosen to lead these efforts. The result would lead to many years of
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oversight battle and reforms of the acquisition process. A closer look at the reforms and
the resulting documents follow in the chain of events.
2.4 The Beginning of DoDD 5000 and Its Reforms
2.4.1 The Start of the DoDD 5000 series
During the 1969 review, Secretary Packard established the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), which essentially served the same functions as
today’s Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) or Defense Space Acquisition Board (DSAB)
(1:74). The DSARC’s main function was to advise the Secretary of Defense of anything
considered significant in the acquisition of a defense program. Secretary Packard also
asked that the Director of Defense Research & Engineering conduct management reviews
“at least once on each major acquisition program” (1:74).
Secretary Packard had other ideas for improving the acquisition process. He
published these ideas in a memorandum that became the foundation for the first DoD
Directive 5000.1 published in 1971. The new “5000 series” (1:75) called for
“decentralization of responsibility and authority for the acquisition of major defense
systems to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the urgency and importance of a
particular defense system being acquired” (5:75). Secretary Packard recognized the need
to limit oversight of programs to only items that could potentially damage the system.
His basic premise was that if anything was wrong with the program, it would be
discovered at the lowest level. Therefore, DoDD 5000.1 “ordered that program managers
be given adequate authority to make major decisions, rewards for good work, and more
recognition toward career advancement” (5:75). With the new DoDD 5000 series, the
DoD assumed “responsibility for establishing acquisition policy....” (5:75), but the DoD
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services were responsible for identifying their needs and actually acquiring the items to
fulfill them. The first of the 5000 series was only seven pages long and stated the duties
of only three DoD officials (21:111).
2.4.2 Past Reforms to DoDD 5000.1
Ferrara (21:113) points out that “with very few exceptions there has not been
wide variation in the fundamental management principles underlying the defense
acquisition system.” Even the first published version of DoDD 5000.1 pushed for the
centralization of policy making, but emphasized decentralized program execution.
Ferrara cites two statements made in two different versions of the DoDD 5000 series.
The first is from the 1971 version:
Responsibility and authority for the acquisition of major defense systems shall be
decentralized to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the urgency and
importance of each program (21:113).
The 1977 version states:
Responsibility for the management of system acquisition programs shall be
decentralized to the DoD Components except for decisions retained by the Secretary of
Defense
(21:113).
This oversight decentralization recommendation goes back to the acquisition
policies in use the years prior to World War II when the key program decisions were
made in Washington and the routine, system program decisions were made by the ones
performing the day-to-day tasks of running the program.
With each new Presidential term, there has been at least one change to the DoDD
5000 series. The revision in 1975 created DoDI 5000.2, the “instruction guidelines
governing the use of the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) and the DSARC” (21:116).
With the new DoDI 5000.2, the DSARC was only an advisory panel to the Secretary of
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Defense on MDAPs. This format was held in place for two years, until 1977 and the
development of a new milestone was implemented. The 1977 revision, signed two days
prior to President Carter’s inauguration, put an end to DoDI 5000.2 and made it an actual
DoD Directive (21:117). The 1977 revision cancelled the DSARC and placed the duties
and responsibilities of the DSARC members directly into the directive. “The major
change evident in this version was the addition of a new milestone….demonstration and
validation” (21:117). The two prior versions of DoDD 5000 contained only three
milestones.
In 1977, after all these additional oversight additions, a comment was made by the
Chairman of the Acquisition Cycle Task Force of the Defense Science Board:
“These procedural changes have become institutionalized and have been applied
inflexibly to all programs with the result that the acquisition process has steadily
lengthened and the procurement of defense systems has become increasingly costly”
(1:79). This statement synopsizes a perception of constant change and reform that
perhaps shows no signs of stopping.
The 1980 revision of DoDD 5000, again added a new document to “summarize
the implementation plan of the DoD Component for the life cycle of the system”
(21:118). This revision added more oversight and more documentation to the acquisition
process. This swing of centralization and decentralization of oversight continues to
fluctuate throughout the history of the DoDD 5000 series. Even in 1982, with the
implementation of the Carlucci Initiatives, the decision to centralize the oversight process
was tied to DoDD 5000. The Carlucci Initiatives contained 32 management initiatives,
including multiyear procurement and linking acquisition and budgeting. Some of these
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ideas presented were reminiscent of the old “concurrency” process from the beginning of
the space acquisition programs and in the years prior to World War II. By 1982, the goal
was to reduce oversight and increase responsibility at the lowest level. With the media
reports of $500 hammers and $300 toilet seats in the mid-1980s, Congress demanded new
acquisition oversight procedures. There came a point when “the logjam of procurement
legislation awaiting implementation had become so great that the Pentagon and defense
industry officials pleaded with Congress for a moratorium on further reform legislation”
(21:119). The biggest change in that time period was the creation of the Defense
Acquisition Executive (DAE). This new position was established to show Congress that
the Pentagon was taking steps in the right direction to fix its acquisition problems. This
assurance was again accomplished by increasing oversight and adding layers to an
already burdensome system.
In 1985, Packard was requested by President Reagan to form another Commission
on acquisition. In 1987, this commission attempted to issue new recommendations based
on Packard’s original ideas when the first DoDD 5000 was issued. One new
recommendation was the creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
(USD(A)). Even though the newest revision was deemed controversial, it made
significant changes that are still seen today. One of those major changes was the creation
of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). This group was slightly larger than its
predecessor, the DSARC, but it essentially served the same purpose. DABs were created
for each specific section (i.e., aircraft). Each DAB was to become the “experts” in that
area. When initially started, there were a total of 10 DABs, some focusing on specific
topics, but most focused on broad issues. At one point, there were at least 126 different
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DABs and committees that reported to the new USD(A) (21:120). Another item with the
1987 revision was the increasing of milestones from four to six. These milestones added
oversight to an area where it was felt that oversight was needed, at the beginning and the
middle of the production cycle. In the attempt to streamline the acquisition process, the
Packard Commission inadvertently added additional layers to the process.
In 1991, oversight became more centralized only to become decentralized again in
a revision in 1996. The new 1991 revision made the DoDD 5000.2 an instruction once
more, but added a new DoD 5000.2-M Manual to the stack of documents. The DoDD
5000 series, as a basic “cookie cutter” acquisition procedure for MDAPs, was now
creating a policy of “no supplements” for this version and that it was for all programs,
regardless of size (21:121). The 1991 version ballooned to approximately 900 pages and
152 references to other sources. The 1991 documents also created acquisition categories,
or “ACATs” (21:122). Although the statutory requirements of Title 10 were still upheld,
it created additional tiers of oversight for the smaller acquisition programs due to the
newly created ACAT levels.
After this new oversight was created, the 1996 version of DoDD 5000 was issued
and removed some of the past restrictions and centralization. The 1996 version came
with four objectives (21:122-123):
1. Clearly separate mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary
practices. This decentralized control and allowed managers to once again
attempt to control their programs.
2. Took new laws and regulations since the last update and included them in the
series.
3. Consolidated, for the first time, policies for MDAPS and automated
information systems.
4. Finally, try and stop the overall feeling that the 5000 series was getting too
large and too complex to understand and implement.
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The goal was to make it easier to use and provide understandable guidance for all
major systems. The latest revision included space programs. The 1996 version also
implemented a recommendation from the Acquisition Reform Process Action Team of
having Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for the acquisition programs (17:38).
Since 1996, there have been two additional revisions to the DoDD 5000 series,
one of them being finalized at the time of this research effort. The new DoDD 5000
series will implement more decentralization than previous editions. One of the major
changes in the acquisition process is the ability to separate acquisition programs into
different acquisition procurement channels. This separation is accomplished by allowing
waivers from the constraints of DoDD 5000 and places the program into these separate
proposed tracks. These proposed tracks are currently acquisition under DoDD 5000
series, space systems acquisitions, Ballistic Missile Defense acquisitions, and acquisitions
operating in a virtual realm which is called C3I RIT. All of these processes have some
connection to the basic DoDD 5000 series, but each has its own perceived cost saving
methodology. Because this research concentrates on space systems, it is the acquisition
reform process as it applies specifically to the history of space acquisition that needs
particular attention. Space acquisition had its beginning in the “black world.” In order to
relate the transformation of oversight to the new space acquisition process the history of
the Corona Project is reviewed.
2.5 History of Space Acquisition-the Corona Project
The United States space acquisition program was started almost by accident.
Space was barely mentioned or considered until the United States captured and
interviewed the creator of the V-2 rocket, German scientist, Dr. Werner von Braun, who
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submitted a report about the future of space and “included ideas about satellites” (34:4).
This report caught the Navy’s attention and the department was interested in creating a
satellite test program.
By the time two different test studies were completed, the United States Air Force
had been created and in 1948, Gen Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, learned that the
Air Force “had the logical responsibility for the satellite” (34:6). But even after the Navy
withdrew its request for its own satellite programs, the remaining program was given
limited funding and restricted on the research and development of the satellite.
In the early 1950s, the RAND (Research ANd Development) company was
awarded a contract to do a feasibility study on the use of satellites for photographic
imagery of earth. During RAND’s study, another group was establishing the
requirements for reconnaissance for the years 1952 through 1960. The concept of
satellite use was never entertained in the reconnaissance plan. The only comment made
was that satellite systems would not be worth the financial outlay required.
In September 1953, the RAND report was sent to the ARDC for possible
development and design. By December of that same year, “Project 409-40” was born. It
was given the unofficial designation of “Weapon System 117L” (34:15). Since the
design exploration was completed, the next step was to find a contractor who would
attempt to put the WS-117L into space. In June 1956, Lockheed was awarded the
contract (34:25). The biggest challenge the program faced was the limited budget of $3
million for a program that required extensive testing of the design and the technology
needed had not been developed. In November of that same year, the program was halted
until the launch of the Russian satellite, Sputnik, had shown the need for satellites. After
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the Sputnik launch in 1957, the need for the United States to get reconnaissance into
space became a top priority. When the true satellite concept was finally realized, it was
set up to be a generalized program with minimal oversight. The basic program was run
with the basis of “instructions were not so much marching orders as ‘marching
suggestions’” (34:43).
With the limited oversight established under the Corona Project, from the initial
concept exploration in 1953 to the first launch in 1959, showed how quickly a program
can move with decentralized oversight. The process was seen as successful because “the
group was so small and its members were so close that decisions could be made jointly”
(34:43). From the beginning of the launches in 1959 until the program ended in 1972,
145 satellites were developed, enhanced, improved, and launched.
The Corona project was conducted in a shroud of secrecy that did not follow the
normal acquisition guidelines of those times. That theory carried forward as the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was born on 10 June 1960 (34:94). Even through the
1990s, a separate acquisition process was used by the NRO, separate from other agencies.
This process contained limited oversight and a perception of quick acquisition timelines.
However, as space became more available to the world, the use of satellites and missiles
became more open. With the creation of the DoDD 5000 series, more of the space
acquisitions fell under the control of the directives and was placed under the standard
oversight process for acquisitions. This gradual move brought the once decentralized
process under a centralized control.
With the knowledge of the NRO acquisition process and the foresight of the need
for acquisition oversight reforms, the DoDD 5000 acquisition guidance was seen as
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ineffective for space programs. A change was needed and a new direction was taking
place in space acquisition.
2.6 Recognizing the Need for Change
On 11 July 2001, a report was published by the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization. In this report, several
aspects of the United States Space Program were reviewed. One key point was the way
the acquisition environment and oversight of space was handled by different
organizations and the need for central control. One item for potential change was the
way the information was presented to key decision makers and another was who those
key decision makers were. As seen in Figure 2.1, the flow of information is sent from
different locations for decisions for different levels. This type of oversight
“responsibility and accountability for space are broadly diffused throughout the
government” (11:xix).
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Figure 2.1: Acquisition Management Chain of Command (11:xix)
In the Commission on Space report, it is shown that both the military services as
well as the NRO execute specific space programs. The military leaves it up to each
service to define and implement their own space program to meet their needs, but “no
single service has been assigned statutory responsibility to ‘organize, train and equip’ for
space operations” (11:xxii). According to the report, “eighty-five percent of spacerelated budget activity within the (DoD)….resides with the Air Force” (11:xxii).
The NRO currently “is the single national organization tasked to meet the U.S.
Government’s intelligence needs for space-borne reconnaissance” (11:xxiii). The NRO
is a joint venture between the DoD and the CIA. With their concerted effort, they try to
maintain the needs of the intelligence community.
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Highlighting the differences between the NRO acquisition process and the main
DoD process followed by the Air Force, the Commission shows that the NRO takes a
“cradle-to-grave” approach while the Air Force separates the process among different
commands (11:xxvi). Understanding these differences, a chance to merge the above
items to create a synergistic effort for space acquisitions programs is needed. With the
Space Commission’s recommendation, a new organizational structure was proposed.
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Figure 2.2: Space Commission’s Proposed Space Acquisition Organization (11:xxvi)

25

Under the proposed organizational structure, some highlights include;
1. Reorganizing the Air Force and making it the sole responsibility for MDAPs in
the Space environment.
2. Align the Air Force and the NRO Space Programs. The Commission to Assess
Space proposed to “Assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. Designate the Under
Secretary as the Air Force Acquisition Executive for Space” (11:xxxiv).
As in 1961, when the Air Force was tasked with the responsibility to take over the
oversight of space acquisition programs, the plan was again set in motion in 2001. With
the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security
Space Management and Oversight to his new position as the Secretary of Defense, the
Honorable Donald Rumsfeld was able to implement the ideas that the Commission had
created as he became the new Secretary of Defense.
2.7 The Realigning of Space Oversight
With the findings of the Commission to Assess Space and a new Secretary of
Defense in charge, on 18 October 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld signed a memorandum that
stated, “I agree with the Commission’s conclusion that a new and comprehensive
approach to national security space management and organization is needed….” (41:1).
With this letter, the implementation of the new national security space program was set in
motion. Secretary Rumsfeld’s letter was preceded by a press conference, given by him,
highlighting the changes. In that conference, he stated, “The majority of these changes
involve realigning Air Force headquarters and field commands to more effectively
organize, train and equip for space operations, ensuring that the Air Force will become
the lead for space activities in the Department of Defense” (45:2).
The first recommendation was to establish a policy for acquisition that could
easily be followed, but maintained the goals of the Commission. With the proposal to
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emulate the best practices of all services and the basic format of the NRO acquisition
process, NRO Directive 7 was used as the foundation for the new space acquisition
policy. In Directive 7, the general policy is, “the NRO will acquire systems using a fastpaced, streamlined management process” (31:Attach 1:2). The policy’s objective is to
create frequent interaction between the decision makers and the individual program
managers. The NRO’s Directive focuses on decentralized decision making except for
three key periods in the program’s life-cycle, which are called “key decision points” or
KDPs (31: Attach 1:2). The NRO follows a program where all data is collected prior to
the KDP for each milestone and a team of experts is collected for the purpose of
evaluating the program independently, and providing a status for the Director, NRO.
This team is known as the Integrated Program Assessment Team (IPAT) and the process
is called the Integrated Program Assessment (IPA) (31:Attach 1:5). To complete the
KDP, the IPAT must give the program a passing evaluation for the NRO Acquisition
Board (NAB), where the NRO Director makes the decision to move forward. This
process is perceived as successful due to the limited oversight and the fact that the IPA
members have no stake in the outcome and provide a true independent review.
Taking the best practices from the other services and emulating the NRO process,
the new space system acquisition policy was established. With a series of
memorandums, delegations were made to comply with Secretary of Defense’s vision and
to comply with the recommendations of the Space Commission. Table 2.1 lists the chain
of these memorandums and the direction in which they moved the space acquisition
system.
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Table 2.1: Policy Letters Establishing Space Acquisition Oversight
Date

Subject

From

To

Reason

No Date
Given

AF Senior Procurement
Executive Authorities
and Responsibilities
AF Senior Procurement
Executive Authorities
and Responsibilities
Delegation of Milestone
Decision Authority for
DoD Space Systems

SECAF

USECAF

USECAF

Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force (Acquisition)
ASAF(A)
All Military Secretaries
Under Secretary of
Defense(Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I)
USECAF/DNRO
USECAF
ASAF(A)

Designation of USECAF to
Senior Procurement
Exectutive (SPE) (37)
Designation of ASAF(A) to
Senior Procurement
Exectutive (SPE) (46)
Notification of Space
program MDAPs MDA to
SECAF, but re-delegation
limited to USECAF/DNRO
(2)

No Date
Given
4 Feb 2002

7 Feb 2002

14 Mar 2002

1 Apr 2002

AF Acquisition
Executive Authorities
and Responsibilities
Re-Delegation of
Milestone Decision
Authority for DoD
Space Systems
Space Based Radar
Acquisition

12 Apr 2002

Organizational StandUp of Executive Agent
for Space

29 May 2002

Fiscal Year (FY) 2002
Major Defense
Acquisition Program
(MDAP) Lists
Independent Cost
Estimates

2 Oct 2002

USECDEF

SECAF

SECAF

USECAF/DNRO

USECAF

USECDEF (AT&L)

DoD
SECAF
administrative
assistant
USECDEF

Distribution C

All Secretaries of the
Military Departments and
Director, Missile Defense
Agency
All Secretaries of the
Military Departments
USECDEF(Comptroller)
ASECDEF(C3I)
USECAF/DNRO

USECDEF

21 Nov 2002

Defense Space
Acquisition Board

USECAF

Several Recipients
(Too long to list)

4 Mar 2003

National Security Space
(NSS) Acquisition

USECAF

20 Mar 2003

Exemption and Waiver
to DoDI 5000.2 and
Related Guidance for
AF Program Executive
Officer for Space
(AFPEO/SP) Space
Programs
Full Funding Policy for
DoD Space Programs

USECAF

All Service Secretaries,
CJCS
USECDEF (AT&L),
ASECDEF(C3I),
Director,(OT&E), DDNRO
Air Force Program
Executive Office for Space

29 May 2003

7 Jul 2003

Delegation of (DoD)
Executive Agent for
Space Responsibilities

USECAF

D,PA&E

SECAF

USECAF
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Assisting in the fulfillment of
Air Force Acquisition
Executive duties (36)
Re-delegated all MDA to
USECAF/DNRO
(39)
Established SBR as a test
program for the new space
acquisition process (51)
Eliminated and created
specific chains for the space
acquisition process (14)
Redesignated some space
programs for lower levels of
oversight IAW the new space
process (3)
Eliminated the need for CAIG
as responsible for Cost
Estimate—Established that
the AF has sole responsibility
to comply
(4)
Establishes the Director of
National Security Space
Integration as the Executive
Secretary for the Defense
Space Acquisition Board
(47)
Authorizes the release of NSS
Acquisiton Policy 03-01 as
interim guidance
(50)
Grants exemption and
waivers from DoDI 5000.2
for use of streamlined space
acquisition process
(48)

Recommends the elimination
of “full funding at KDP”
policy (49)
Delegates all DoD Executive
Agent for Space to USECAF
(38)

With the memorandums channeled and the approval received, the National
Security Space Acquisition Policy (NSSAP) 03-01 was implemented as interim guidance.
The NSSAP 03-01 incorporates much of NRO Directive 7, along with a few best
practices. The goal was to tailor the acquisition process for space programs so the needs
of National Security could be met in a streamlined process with a limited and
decentralized oversight process. One reason noted in a Government Accounting Office
(GAO) report focused on common problems in acquisition in military space programs. It
was noted that the life-cycle spending on the space programs differs from spending on
aircraft MDAPs. Normal DoD lifecycle profiles show that 28 percent of a normal
program’s budget is spent in its development, while 72 percent goes into the operations
and support items for a certain period of time, as seen below.
T yp ic a l D o D L ife C yc le C o s t C u rve
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Figure 2.3: Funds Allocation in MDAP (33)
.

For the space environment, the budget expenditure profile is exactly the opposite.

The funds are needed up front to ensure the system will work once launched (23:8). For
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space programs, a traditional full rate production effort does not exist like there is in
aircraft operations and support. On space programs, much of the work is done up front to
eliminate any potential system failures once the satellite is launched. There are very few
second chances once a satellite system is placed in service. The true expenditure profile
of a space life cycle cost curve can be seen in Figure 2.4 in comparison to a typical DoD
life cycle cost curve.

Typical DoD Life Cycle Cost Curve

Notional Space Life Cycle Cost Curve

Operations & Support

System Acquisition

System Acquisition
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70%

72%

Operations & Support
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Life Cycle Curve DSMC Acq Log Guide 1997
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“B”

Notional Life Cycle Curve
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“B” “C”
“A”
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“C”

Figure 2.4: Comparing Normal MDAP to Space MDAP (33)
Because of this new process, new oversight controls are implemented as well.
With NSSAP 03-01, the IPA process is brought up in full force with full explanations of
who is responsible for specific duties. Once the Program Manager feels he/she is ready
for a DSAB, a request is made and a date is set, and the calendar is rolled back for
specific points in time to be met. A graphical presentation is given in NSSAP 03-01 and
is replicated for easy interpretation of the IPA process. The IPA process is repeated once
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the program has reached a KDP for each KDP in the satellite’s life-cycle acquisition
profile.
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Figure 2.5: Extract from NSSAP 03-01 on IPA Process (19)
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With the new process and information flow created by NSSAP 03-01, oversight is
expected to decentralize and is hypothesized by some as being a cost effective way to
manage MDAPs across all services.
2.8 Is it Working and How Will We Know?
After the implementation of NSSAP 03-01 as interim guidance, the new policy
has already come under close scrutiny by civilian journals and the GAO. Some
opponents were critical of the cost of space programs but recognized the efforts of the
Undersecretary of Defense and that he “has identified eight priorities.” Among the list is
“getting space acquisition programs on track” (7:1). But the criticism still remains that
the SBR program “has requested $274 million and has an estimated launch cost of $4.4
billion, (according to) Teets” (7:2).
In one GAO study, a pre-NSSAP 03-01 review was initiated to review the current
challenges facing space programs and procurement. They noted, that although changes
are coming, there are still challenges facing this new process. The GAO warns that:
“Unless DoD adopts knowledge-based practices, space control acquisitions, such as the
Space-Based Surveillance System, may well face higher cost and schedule risks” (24:2).
The warning incorporates an understanding that if a program is not decentralized and a
streamlined oversight process is not accepted at all levels, the costs and schedule could be
increased and prolonged.
In another GAO study, after the NSSAP 03-01 interim guidance was issued, the
GAO recognized that DoD “was taking steps to streamline the acquisition process and
reduce the time it takes to acquire space-based systems required by the national security
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space community” (22:14). The GAO stated that the SBR was the first true hope for
testing the new NSSAP 03-01 process.
So how do we know when the oversight process is working and how will we
compare the cost of oversight? In the overview, the goal of this chapter was presented as
showing how the process changed over time and how the focus moved from
decentralized to centralized oversight and the struggle between the processes. The
biggest problem was trying to find a way to compare the costs of the oversight process
alone. The only document found addressing with any calculations of actual oversight
cost did not provide any background information or methodology, but did provide a basic
number for comparison. The Acquisition Reform Process Action Team published a
document in 1994 that stated that a few programs were tracked and the cost of reviews
was estimated. “Our estimates suggested that the costs were on the order of $10-12M,
including the costs of a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis” (17:9). That initial
amount quoted was estimated for each milestone and “could add approximately $40-50M
to a program over its life” (17:9).
Taking the estimate from the Process Action Team, and applying it to the current
space programs listed on the SAR equates to $35.79 billion among seven programs. That
would estimate the cost of oversight to $30-36M per program. Even though this dollar
amount represents less than one percent of the total amount of programs’ budget, the
figures $210-252M for the total in potential space MDAP oversight a substantial amount
of resources that could be spent on other programs.
This thesis will create a foundation by using a panel of experts to estimate the cost
of space acquisition oversight using the current NSSAP 03-01 IPA process and compare
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these initial results to those of other acquisition methods. The findings of this thesis
could come up with a potential measurement for any oversight savings by the new
decentralization process and display any reluctance of experts to adopt the streamlining
reforms. By identifying the main cost drivers and comparing with the other acquisition
methods, the potential of future streamlining efforts may be able to focus on reducing or
eliminating the cost drivers with the potential of reducing the vertical layers in the
oversight process.
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3.0 Methodology
3.1 Overview
From the previous two chapters, we now have a clear picture of the focus of this
research. This research will attempt to estimate the cost of oversight of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) strictly under the direction of the new National Security
Space Acquisition Policy 03-01. In addition to estimating the cost of oversight, the aim
of this research is to answer specific research questions outlined in Chapter 1. Again, the
first and most important question to be answered is what is the cost of oversight for space
programs? The next question is how does the cost of oversight for space programs
compare to the cost of oversight for MDAPs operating under a different framework;
specifically, communications acquisition programs, which are operating in a “virtual
box”, and “box” programs which are operating under the DoDD 5000 series? The final
research question to be answered is what are the five key drivers that affect the cost of
oversight of MDAPs? As noted in Chapter 2, the Delphi Method of surveying experts
will be employed to address these questions. This chapter will outline the Delphi
Method, how it works, and how specifically the Delphi Method will be utilized for this
research.
3.2 Delphi Method Background
In this section, of the chapter, some background information on the Delphi
Method is provided. After discussing the history of the Delphi Method, it is important to
discuss what it is, and finally describes how it works. After discussing the history and
providing a thorough background, the Delphi Method will prove itself as a perfect fit and
the chapter will close with why the Delphi Method was the chosen methodology for this
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research. The methodology for the execution of this current research project will be
interspersed within the description of each of these subject areas.
3.2.1 History of the Delphi Method
According to Clayton, the name “Delphi” was associated with Greek mythology
and refers to a Delphi Oracle which was capable of predicting the future (10:376). The
Delphi Method was actually born in the 1960s out of the American defense industry as
part of a project called “Project Delphi”, which was a study conducted by the RAND
Corporation in support of an exploration by the Air Force (8:700-701). The U.S. Air
Force wanted to determine what would be key nuclear targets and what would be the
likely number of warheads employed against the United States in the event of nuclear
attack by the Soviets. “Project Delphi” sought to reach a consensus of expert opinion in
order to answer those two critical questions from the viewpoint of a Soviet nuclear
strategist.
3.2.2 What is the Delphi Method?
The Delphi Method is best described as a communication tool that facilitates a
communication process by allowing a group of individuals to work as a whole to deal
with a problem (8:701). The Delphi Method attempts to reach a consensus of opinion
among the members of the group, which will here on be referred to as an expert panel,
through a series of questionnaires. A key element of the questionnaires is that they are
completed anonymously to allow for freedom of expression and then collected,
summarized and returned to panel members to give them the opportunity to refine
original responses with the added benefit of knowing the rest of the panel members’
responses. This process is continued, “until consensus is obtained or the law of
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diminishing returns sets in” (25:1010). Another key element of the process is that the
panel is made up of pre-selected experts who never physically have to be in the same
location. The process, which came into practice in the 1960s, could only be conducted by
traditional mail, but of course can now be conducted via the web or e-mail, or a
combination of both.
3.2.3 How the Delphi Method Works
The previous section of this chapter offered a preliminary look at how the Delphi
Method works, but this section will go into much greater detail on the workings of the
Delphi Method. First, it is important to answer some questions. The first is why use a
panel of experts that never meet instead of just a single expert. The reason is that an
individual is operating along which means they could forget something or fail to consider
an issue. Clayton highlighted this issue when he discussed the fact that individuals don’t
get the benefit of hearing the ideas of others so that they can perhaps refine their ideas
(10:375). Clayton goes on to state that by combining the judgment of a large number of
people, there’s a better chance of arriving at the truth.
With explaining the need for separated groups, a new question arises. If a group
is better than an individual, wouldn’t it be better to put them in a room together to allow
them to brainstorm and hammer out a consensus? Though this research operates under
Clayton’s premise that the shared ideas of a group of experts is better than a single
expert, putting a panel in a room together could lead to group think (10:375). This
phenomenon is the result of a few dominant personalities controlling the discussion and
potentially strong arming a consensus despite the initial objections of possibly better
informed, yet more timid panel members.
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Now that the two preliminary questions regarding the overall set up of the Delphi
Method have been answered, the next step is to describe the workings of the Delphi
Method. To aid in this presentation, the key elements of the workings of the Delphi
Method are explained best in Figure 3.1.

Start

Problem Definition

Select Panel Members

Distribute Questionaire

Analyse Questionnaire

Consensus Reached?

NO

Provide summarized responses

Develop Final Report

Figure 3.1: Oversight Approval Levels (16:2)
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YES

First, a problem is defined. For this research, the research questions are the main
problems defined which is to determine the cost of oversight for space programs as well
as compare the costs of those space programs to the virtual and “box” programs. The
other research focus, using the Delphi Method, is to determine key oversight cost drivers.
The next step is to develop a questionnaire that is specific enough to divulge the data
necessary to answer those questions. The following step is to select a panel of experts to
answer the questionnaire. The questionnaires are then sent to the panel and when
completed they are collected, analyzed, and summarized. If consensus is not reached, the
summarized responses will then be sent back out to the panel to allow them to rethink the
questions now that they have the added benefit of the input from the other group
members. This process of sending out the questionnaires and then getting them back and
analyzing them continues in a looping pattern and each loop is referred to as a “round.”
Each time a new questionnaire is distributed marks the beginning of a new round. The
number of rounds is determined by the achievement of consensus of the expert’s
opinions. Early criticisms of the Delphi Method centered on the fact that, due to lack of
technology, originally questionnaires were sent by traditional mail channels. Depending
on the number of rounds needed to achieve consensus, the process took from several
months up to a year or two to complete. Today’s technology enables the process to flow
more quickly, and for the purpose of this particular research effort, all communication
during the process will be conducted via e-mail. Chou takes this e-mail centered Delphi
methodology a step further by conducting a web based Delphi Process whereby panel
members and the survey director interact in a shared web program (9:233-236). In
summary, the Delphi Method, as employed in this research effort, will act as a
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communication facilitator that attempts to achieve a consensus of opinions from an
anonymous, geographically separated panel of experts through a series of questionnaires
all conducted via e-mail.
3.2.3.1. The Rounds of the Delphi Method
As previously mentioned, each time a questionnaire is distributed to panel
members and returned to the person directing the research effort constitutes a round of
the Delphi Method. The question that arises deals with how many rounds of the Delphi
are necessary to ensure the data is stable. Clayton states that only four phases are needed
and that the final round is sent out to “provide reasons as to why they agree or disagree
with the final results” (10:129). Chan et al. agreed in their study by establishing four
rounds (8:701). However, Ludwig states that “Delphi rounds continue until a
predetermined level of consensus is reached or no new information is gained” (29:3).
While a study in Scotland, by Dr. Kerr, limited the number of rounds to three (26:3). In
recent nursing research, Hasson et al. limited the number of rounds depending on “time
available…” (25:1011) The research did not find a specific number of rounds needed.
Most researchers using the Delphi Method set the criteria of consensus and time available
while some limited on a firm number. Based on the evidence, the Delphi method as
employed in this research effort to answer the research questions, will contain a minimum
of two rounds and a maximum of four.
3.2.3.2 Delphi Method Questionnaires
Mitchell goes into great detail outlining the construction and administration of the
Delphi questionnaires. He clearly outlined the length the questionnaire should be by
stating how long it should take each panel member to complete the questionnaire. On
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this topic he states that the questionnaire should take no longer than 30 minutes to
complete (30:345). The basis for this assertion is his own experience as he goes on to
state that there have been no empirical studies conducted on the appropriate length of
time to complete a Delphi questionnaire. Mitchell also discusses the construction of the
questionnaire for each round of the Delphi Method. He states that questions should be
clearly stated and should not be identical from round to round because the repetition
could cause participant boredom, which could hamper results (30:342). Clayton also
discussed the format of the questionnaires on a round by round basis. He states that
round one questionnaires should be clearly worded but allow for the most freedom in
responses. Round one responses, once collected, should be turned into generic
statements summarized with measures of central tendency and then resent to panel
members to begin round two. In round two, the process of seeking consensus begins. To
aid in the quest for consensus, panel members that wish to change previous responses
must provide reasons for doing so. In round three and subsequent rounds, questionnaires
should summarized responses with a summary of reasons for changing responses and this
process continues until consensus is met (10:378). The questionnaires in support of this
research effort will be constructed according to the procedures outlined by Clayton and
Mitchell. The number of questions will be limited to 10 or less. The maximum amount
of time needed to complete each questionnaire is estimated at 20 minutes. Each returning
questionnaire’s questions are altered in each round based on the previous round’s input.
This will ensure each panel member has the opportunity to re-evaluate each question.
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3.2.3.3 Delphi Method Consensus
The rounds of questionnaires must eventually come to a close. In order to set the
parameters prior to beginning, once consensus is reached, the rounds will discontinue.
Webster’s New International Unabridged Dictionary defines consensus as, “unanimity or
general agreement in matters of opinion” (52:567). If that definition is applied to the
Delphi Method as employed in this research effort, once the panel reaches a majority
opinion, the process is complete; but just a majority may not be enough. Simply
operating under the theme of “majority rule” could overlook important, though less
frequently occurring opinions. Therefore, in terms of the application of the Delphi
Method for this research effort, consensus must be defined. The problem, as Williams
and Webb state, “Consensus is poorly explained in studies which use the Delphi
technique…” (53:182). Hasson et al. also state that “A universally agreed proportion
does not exist for the Delphi…” (25:1011). Hasson et al. does list various studies who
established percentages for defining consensus, but all vary dramatically and result in
mostly a straight majority rules. This study completed by Schiebe et al. recommends
stability of responses throughout the rounds as a better indicator of consensus by
evaluating the changes in the questions to a quartile in a distribution (42:IV:C). Without
much empirical evidence to support a concrete definition of consensus, this research
effort will take an approach similar to the one recommended by Schiebe et al. Each
question will be evaluated on the response and as answers become stable, the question
will be considered “closed” until all questions are closed or four rounds have been
completed.
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3.2.3.4 Delphi Method Expert Panel
Another obstacle when performing the Delphi Method is deciding how big the
expert panel should be. Spinelli conducted research utilizing the Delphi Method and the
panel consisted of “24 key influential persons knowledgeable as to the factors influencing
the general environment…” (44:74). Ludwig conducted research but had a different
approach to establishing a panel. Ludwig stated that “The number of respondents was
generally determined by the number required to constitute a representative pooling of
judgements and the information summarizing capability of the research team” (29:2).
This establishes the precedent that as long as all members of the focus research are
represented, the number of members on the panel is up to the researcher. Ludwig then
states “The majority of Delphi studies have used between 15-20 respondents and run over
periods of several weeks” (29:2). Chan et al stated in their selection process “The ten
members of the panel represent a wide distribution of professional people…” (8:701).
Another study by Des Marchais reduced the panel size to six (12:504), but overall,
William and Webb summarize the panel selection methodology by stating “First, there is
no agreement regarding the size of the panel, nor any recommendations concerning
sampling techniques” (53:182).
The panel assembled to answer the research questions posed in this thesis will be
of the heterogeneous type and will embody the principal of breadth of members’
experience while maintaining the similar target career field. The panel will contain a
minimum of five and a maximum of ten members.
Once the size of the panel has been decided, establishing criteria is needed to
judge who the experts are. Based on the findings that were a result of the research
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conducted to complete this chapter, it appears there is no clear cut definition of what
constitutes an expert. While discussing the topic of expert panel member selection,
Mitchell states, “No reported Delphi study has addressed this selection issue” (30:340).
Dawson and Brucker, in their research, summarized the criteria for determining experts
used in several Delphi studies in their field. The common theme was: general experience
of seven years; specific experience of five years; at least one published article; at least
one national conference presentation; and experience should be recent to within the last
three years (15:132-134). For the purpose of this research, those general standards are
relaxed by requiring: general experience of five years; specific experience of two years;
recent experience within the last five years; and no qualification of presentations or
publications.
Once the expert panel is formed, but prior to the process starting, a plan must be
instituted for panel attrition. In a study by Chan et al. conducted in the field of medicine,
they achieved a response rate of 80% and went on to state that derived from various
studies that the average response rate for the medical field ranged from 58% to 80%
(8:708). Mitchell states that, “High rates of attrition may mean that final results are based
upon an unrepresentative sub sample of the original sample” (30:341). To combat panel
attrition and the resulting degraded response rates, this research effort will choose experts
from different but related fields and have at least one backup expert for every expert so in
the end, even with an attrition as high as 50%, all groups will be represented and the bias
that Mitchell describes will be avoided.
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3.3 Uses of the Delphi Method
The Delphi Method has had many uses in research. According to the book The
Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications, the Delphi Method was principally used as
a forecasting tool back as early as the 1960s and went on to say today the Delphi Method
is used for: normative forecast; to ascertain values and preferences; quality of life
estimates; simulated and real decision making; and inventive planning. The book also
went on to state that the Delphi Method is used extensively where “judgmental input
data” is needed when other data is unavailable or too costly (28:615). Hasson et al. stated
that the Delphi Method is used frequently in health and social sciences (25:1008).
Mitchell’s article cites a table listing the use of the Delphi method by percentage by field
of study from a total of 800 studies. Delphi was most heavily used in physical sciences
and engineering (26% of all studies conducted) and the second most frequent usage was
in business and economics (23%) (30:334).
3.4 Criticisms of the Delphi Method
If employed properly, the Delphi Method is an excellent tool for gathering data to
answer questions when that data first appears to be unavailable. Since this research effort
originally sought to analyze historical data and because that data was unavailable, the
Delphi Method appears to be a suitable data collection method. There are criticisms to
bear in mind before using the Delphi Method. The first criticism deals with who actually
decides what qualifies as an “expert”. Clayton acknowledges that expertise is not exactly
measurable however, he states that the criteria is really relative based on the peers of the
experts. For this research effort, criteria for panelists will be based criteria found in the
section on the expert panel found in this chapter. Using Clayton’s premise that experts
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are deemed as such by their peers, the research will include a preliminary survey of
potential experts. Those providing experts will be provided with our panel criteria and
asked whether they agree with each of the criteria or not and why.
Williams and Webb introduce a second criticism of the Delphi Method which is
that the researcher’s analysis and summary of each rounds’ responses could introduce
bias into the process (53:182). That point is well taken and to combat that threat,
responses will be analyzed using basic statistical methods (mean, median, standard
deviation) to the fullest extent possible. Additionally, because this research will conduct
the Delphi Method as part of a group project, there will be more than one set of eyes
analyzing the responses which should also help to keep the process honest.
A final criticism of the Delphi Method regards the question of reliability;
specifically, what evidence is out there that proves the Delphi Method is reliable. In
other words, have studies been conducted that prove findings were consistent in different
Delphi experiments using similarly composed panels answering the same questions.
Williams and Webb found that, “there is no evidence that the Delphi Method is reliable”
(53:182). Hasson et al. support these findings stating that their research discovered,
“There is no evidence of the reliability of the Delphi Method” (25:1012). Mitchell stated
that other studies have found a high degree of replicability which would contradict the
criticism that the Delphi Method is unreliable or at the very least unproven (30:351).
3.5 Strengths of the Delphi Method
The strengths of the Delphi Method outweigh the drawbacks previously
mentioned. First, the Delphi Method enables a group of experts in geographically
separated locations to work together without the cost or other logistical problems
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associated with bringing experts together at a central location (15:129). Anyone who has
tried to put together a major conference would greatly appreciate this strength.
The second strength focuses on the fact that the Delphi Method results in a
consensus of opinion without the bias or group think that might result from a roundtable
process (53:181). This “anonymous factor” ensures all panel members are equally
involved and all panel members feel free to answer honestly. By this, the researcher has
the opportunity to receive uncensored answers.
Williams and Webb’s research also highlights the Delphi concept of conducting a
series of rounds to achieve consensus (53:181). The series of rounds allows panel
members to review the responses of their fellow panel members and gives them the
chance to reconsider or even alter their original responses with the benefit of the added
input of their fellow panel members. Conducting only one round would destroy the
intellectual synergy created by the sharing of ideas throughout the rounds.
Finally, a criticism of the traditional Delphi process that evolved into a strength
for today was that the traditional Delphi process took a long time to complete. This long
period was due to the fact that it was used in the 1960s and 1970s at a time when there
was no means other than through postal channels to conduct Delphi rounds. Chien
Chou’s article highlights the final strength of the Delphi that evolved—speed. Chou
stated that traditional Delphi processes averaged six to twelve months from start to finish,
but with e-mail and web-based Delphi a three round study can be conducted in four
weeks (9:236).

48

3.6 The Reason the Delphi Method was Chosen
The originally theorized methodology for this research effort was to examine the
paper trail left by an actual MDAP going through a milestone decision point i.e. Meeting
minutes, meeting notes, sign in rosters to arrive at an estimated cost of oversight. Using
these documents, the ranks and number of people at the meetings could be ascertained as
well as the number and duration of the meetings. This data could then be used to
estimate a cost of meetings based on length of meeting and the hourly wages of each
attendee. The estimate for meeting costs at every level of vertical oversight could then
be tallied to arrive at a total estimate of the cost of oversight for an MDAP at a certain
key decision point. The problem encountered with this methodology is lack of data.
There was an initial mistake made of assuming the meeting minutes, notes and logs
would be readily available when in fact in some cases they were nonexistent. A
methodology was needed that would enable me to answer the research questions without
the availability of historical data. An article by W.L. Mitchell which appeared in
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, outlines why one would use the Delphi
Method with the number one reason listed being the unavailability of historical data
(30:338).
3.7 Comparative Analysis for Data Collected
Once the rounds of the Delphi are completed, all data from this study must be
statistically compared with the data collected by Neal (32) for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) and Rousseau (40) for Department of Defense
Directive 5000 (DoDD 5000). After acquiring their data, all data for questions two
through ten will be placed into a statistics analytical software package with a graphical
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user interface, such as JMP 5.0.1 statistical software. The data will be entered, for each
question two through ten, in the format shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Data Input for Statistical Analysis
Oversight
2-Low 2-Avg 2-High
NSSAP 03-01
1
4
6
NSSAP 03-01
2
6
9
NSSAP 03-01
1
4
7
NSSAP 03-01
2
4
8
DoDD 5000
6
8
16
DoDD 5000
8
12
18
DoDD 5000
6
10
18
DoDD 5000
6
10
25
DoDD 5000
6
12
18
C3I
12
20
30
C3I
7
9
12
C3I
12
20
30
C3I
12
20
30

The format in Table 3.1 will allow JMP 5.0.1 to analyze the statistical differences and
will provide a value which will test whether or not there is a statistical difference among
the different oversight processes.
To conduct the analysis of variances, each oversight process will compare with
one other oversight at a time. For example, NSSAP 03-01 will compare with DoDD
5000. The null hypothesis for the test is that there is no difference in the data collected.
The alternate is that there is a statistical difference between them. The test significance
for these statistical tests will be set at .05.
The first question will simply compare the different cost drivers identified for
each specific oversight regulating document and provide insight to potential differences.

3.8 Summary
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This research effort is aimed at answering the following research questions:
1. According to experts in the field, what is the estimated cost of oversight for a
space acquisition program under the NSSAP 03-01 IPA oversight process?
2. How does the cost of oversight for space programs compare to the cost of
oversight for programs under the DoDD 5000 series and the virtual acquisition
processes?
3. What are the five main cost drivers for the oversight of space acquisition
programs?

This chapter outlined how this research effort will answer those questions. In
summary, the research will consist of assembling a panel of five to ten experts in the field
of defense acquisition; prepare questionnaires aimed at collecting the cost of oversight at
one key decision point and aimed at identifying oversight cost drivers; then employ the
Delphi Survey technique of sending out the questionnaires, collecting, analyzing,
summarizing, and resending questionnaires to the panel; and continue with the Delphi
rounds until a consensus of expert opinion is reached. In Chapter 4, the results of each
round’s questionnaires will be recorded and analyzed.
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4.0 Data Results
4.1 Overview
The goal of chapter 4 is to provide the collection of the expert panel members for
the Delphi Method and the generalized demographics of the panel members while still
maintaining the members’ anonymity. The next section will provide the results of the
survey for each question. The results will be presented for one question as it passed
through the four separate rounds of the Delphi Method. The information provided will
include the initial answers for each question and how the answer changed through the
rounds of the Delphi Method. The final section will provide a summary of results and
reiterate the goal of the Delphi Method to ensure all objectives were met. The first
research question for the total cost of oversight for space under the NSSAP 03-01 will be
answered in the summary of results section. The discussion will also include the next
step on the analysis of oversight and what will be used to statistically compare these
results with the data gathered by Neal (32) and Rousseau (40).
To establish the cost of oversight, an algorithm was created with multiplies and
adds the respondents estimates together to create low, average, and high estimates for the
cost of oversight. This is completed by taking questions two, three, and four and
multiplying them together to create a TDY cost estimate. Then taking questions five, six,
and seven and multiplying them together to create a personnel cost estimate. Then,
questions eight, nine, and ten are multiplied together to create a meeting estimate.
Finally, the TDY, personnel, and meeting estimate are added together to provide an
estimate for the cost of one program to get through one decision point. The total program
cost for the low estimate is then represented by the following algorithm:
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3*((Q2low*Q3low*Q4low)+(Q5low*Q6low*Q7low)+(Q8low*Q9low*Q10low))

This will repeat for the average and high estimates as well.
4.2 Panel Selection
The goal of panel selection was to gather experts in the space acquisition field,
but from different viewpoints in the oversight process. The following individuals, listed
on the table below, were selected and numbered to keep them anonymous from each
other.
Table 4.1: Panel Selection Demographics
Number

Military/Civlian

Position

Years Acq

Years

Exp

Space Exp

1

Civilian

Senior GS Employee

24

24

2

Military

Senior Military Officer

19

13

3

Military

University Professor in Acquisition

19

7

4

Civilian

Retired Military, Civ Contractor

8

8

5

Military

University Professor in Acquisition

18

4

Since the members are now numbered, the rest of the results and analysis will
refer to only the number assigned for the Delphi Method. As seen in Table 4.1, there is a
broad range of years of experience as well as the difference in viewpoints of the
acquisition process. According to the information provided in the methodology section,
this will provide the most probability of approaching the true answer of the unknown
forecast we are trying to make and compare. These members contain a wealth of
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experience and had the desire to provide feedback. Prior Internal Review Board
permission was requested and obtained for this research and the letter of approval can be
seen in the attachment section.
When the first round was initiated, panel member 5 had to drop out due to an
unforeseen incident. Even without panel member 5, the heterogeneous group was still
maintained and, according to research conducted in chapter 3, four members were still
enough to conduct a Delphi Method survey.
4.3 Question One
From the Program Executive Officer (PEO) recommendation, to the Defense
Systems Acquisition Board (DSAB) approval (including the entire Integrated
Program Assessment (IPA) process), what are the five major cost drivers in the
oversight process?
The goal of question one was to obtain the five key cost drivers that the
respondents felt drove the cost of oversight higher than it should truly be. These items
aren’t always budgeted for and may not have true dollar figures attached, but could
potentially lead to increased costs in oversight.
4.3.1 Results by Round
Round one provided 13 items that were thought to drive costs in the oversight
process. They are listed below, in no particular order;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Time away from primary responsibilities while supporting “this” effort (IPA) at
the expense of the rest of the program.
Adding requirements to original program(from HQ & OSD, or other sources)
TDY from the program office to IPA or IPA folks to program office
Hiring individuals for the IPA may come at program office’s expense
Time of the program office and PEM staff putting together packages as well as
running
them through the system
IPA Personnel Costs (Program evaluation)
ACE Personnel Costs (Process oversight)
SAF/USI Personnel Costs (Process oversight)
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9. IPA Travel/Per Diem costs (Team and support personnel)
10. Facilities and Equipment
11. Salaries of IPA core members and “gray beard” members who are not
government employees
12. Reproduction costs of the briefings, VTCs, copies, long distance calls, other
admin requirements
13. Contractor cost of time spent answering IPA questions

With the 13 responses from round one collected, the drivers were compiled and
sent out in round two. For round two, the members were only allowed to pick five from
the list provided. This is the list that was created by the member and their peers. The
round two results are listed below, again, in no particular order;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Time away from primary responsibilities while supporting “this” effort (IPA) at
the expense of the rest of the program.
Adding requirements to original program(from HQ & OSD, or other sources)
TDY from the program office to IPA or IPA folks to program office
Hiring individuals for the IPA may come at program office’s expense
Time of the program office and PEM staff putting together packages as well as
running them through the system
IPA Personnel Costs (Program evaluation)
SAF/USI Personnel Costs (Process oversight)
IPA Travel/Per Diem costs (Team and support personnel)
Salaries of IPA core members and “gray beard” members who are not
government employees
Contractor cost of time spent answering IPA questions
In round two, only three drivers fell off from the previous round. In round two it

was noticed that most items focus around paying non-DoD members and travel costs.
The drivers eliminated from the previous round were numbers 7, 10, and 12 from round
one.
Once again, these were compiled and sent out for round three, with the same
instructions of picking only five. The answers for round three focused on a few specific
areas, but still had a ways to go from identifying five main drivers. The results from
round three are listed below;
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Time away from primary responsibilities while supporting “this” effort (IPA) at
the expense of the rest of the program.
Adding requirements to original program(from HQ & OSD, or other sources)
TDY from the program office to IPA or IPA folks to program office
Hiring individuals for the IPA may come at program office’s expense
Time of the program office and PEM staff putting together packages as well as
running them through the system
IPA Personnel Costs (Program evaluation)
SAF/USI Personnel Costs (Process oversight)
IPA Travel/Per Diem costs (Team and support personnel)
Salaries of IPA core members and “gray beard” members who are not
government employees
Contractor cost of time spent answering IPA questions

As one can begin to see, a problem was beginning to develop and a new way to
come up with five main drivers was needed. Noticing that there was a few that were on
each listing, the results were ranked by the number of votes received. Three of the items
had the most selections and were set aside as the first three cost drivers. The remaining
items that received two votes or more were left for round four, where the members were
asked to only pick two of the drivers listed. The new list sent for round four is shown
below;
4.
7.
8.
9.

Hiring individuals for the IPA may come at program office’s expense
SAF/USI Personnel Costs (Process oversight)
IPA Travel/Per Diem costs (Team and support personnel)
Salaries of IPA core members and “gray beard” members who are not government
employees

With instructions to only select two from above, the results were almost
unanimous. All members selected driver number 9 and three out of four selected number
8. With all rounds completed, the main cost drivers identified by the Delphi panel are
listed below, in no particular order;
1. Time away from primary responsibilities while supporting “this” effort (IPA) at
the expense of the rest of the program.
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2. TDY from the program office to IPA or IPA folks to program office
3. IPA Personnel Costs (Program Evaluation)
4. Salaries of IPA core members and “gray beard” members who are not government
employees
5. IPA Travel/PerDiem costs (Team and support personnel)

4.4 Question Two
From the PEO recommendation, to the DSAB approval of the KDP, use your
professional judgment and estimate how many TDYs are taken by one person to
get one program through one Key Decision Point (KDP)/Integrated Program
Assessment (IPA) process?
The goal of question two was to find out how many TDYs are taken by one
individual in one program in support of a KDP. The members are asked to provide a
low, high and average, or most likely occurrence for this portion. This will allow us to
establish a triangular distribution that will be used later for the data analysis portion, as
well as allow us to estimate the low, average, and high costs of oversight for our
comparison of the three different MDAP processes.
Question two sets up our initial number in our algorithm to calculate the first
portion of our cost of oversight model. Question two, three, and four will establish a
travel estimate for the cost of oversight.
4.4.1 Question Two - Low Estimate
The low estimate was established early in the survey process. In round one, the
results were split directly down the middle. Two respondents answered 1 and two
answered 2. This did not change at all during the rest of the survey process for all
remaining rounds. Consensus was reached immediately, due to the reluctance of any
member to change this portion of the answer.
4.4.2 Question Two - Average Estimate
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The average, or most likely, estimate was similar to the low estimate. Once the
initial numbers were established, there was no desire to change the answers by any
respondent. The question was left in for three rounds to make sure that no last minute
changes were made, but for the fourth round, it was removed due to the goals stated by
the initial methodology, which was to minimize the standard deviation, or when the
results are not being changed. The results are listed in Table 4.2, shown below. In the
column labeled “Frequency” the answers are given by numerical order for all further
result tables. So the first number is respondent one, the second is respondent two, and it
continues. This will allow the reader to view who made what changes in each round.
Table 4.2: Question Two - Average Estimate Results By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
4 to 6
4 to 6
4 to 6
Consensus

Member 1,2,3,4
4,6,4,4
4,6,4,4
4,6,4,4
Reached

Mean
4.5
4.5
4.5

Median
4
4
4

Std Deviation
1
1
1

4.4.3 Question Two - High Estimate
The high estimate was slightly more volatile than the low and average estimates
for question two. The high estimate moved slightly on the second round and then
remained stationary. After the third round, consensus was declared and the question was
closed. Only one member adjusted their response for question two. The results for
question two-high estimate are found below in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Question Two - High Estimate Results By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
6 to 10
6 to 9
6 to 9
Consensus

Member 1,2,3,4
6,10,7,8
6,9,7,8
6,9,7,8
Reached

Mean
7.75
7.5
7.5
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Median
7.5
7.5
7.5

Std Deviation
1.70782
1.29099
1.29099

4.5 Question Three
Estimate how many people normally go TDY throughout the KDP/IPA process.

Question three established another portion of the travel estimate in our cost of
oversight algorithm. The goal of question three is to find the number of personnel that
actually go TDY in an IPA process for a KDP. The respondents were given the same
instructions as was given with question two and the answers will be presented in the
similar manner.
4.5.1 Question Three - Low Estimate
The low estimate’s standard deviation slowly decreased through out the Delphi
process, shown in Table 4.4 below. Panel member 1 answered 4 on the first round and
changed their answer to 13 in round two, then didn’t change it again for the remaining
rounds. Member 2 answered 20 and stayed with 20 through all four rounds, which was
similar to member 4, who answered 25. Member 3 moved their response the most. Each
round, member 3 changed theirs closer and closer to the average, which is expected in
this type of survey. This question was not closed until all rounds were completed.
Table 4.4: Question Three - Low Estimate Results By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
3 to 25
10 to 25
12 to 25
13 to 25

Member 1,2,3,4
4,20,3,25
13,20,10,25
13,20,12,25
13,20,15,25

Mean
13
17
17.5
18.25

Median
12
16.5
16.5
17.5

Std Deviation
11.16542
6.78233
6.13731
5.37742

4.5.2 Question Three - Average Estimate
The average estimate for question three went all four rounds of the survey. The
results are listed in Table 4.5 on the next page. The standard deviation was decreased by
over 50 percent and the range was decreased as well. Members 1 and 4 selected an
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estimate and elected not to change their answer through all four rounds. Member 2
changed their estimate on the last round and member 3 changed their estimate at each
survey round.
Table 4.5: Question Three - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
6 to 30
15 to 30
20 to 30
20 to 30

Member 1,2,3,4
20,30,6,30
20,30,15,30
20,30,25,30
20,25,25,30

Mean
21.5
23.75
26.25
25

Median
25
25
27.5
25

Std Deviation
11.35781
7.5
4.78713
4.08248

4.5.3 Question Three - High Estimate
The high estimate results, listed in table 4.6, show almost the same pattern as the
average results. Members 1 and 4 selected an estimate and stuck with it and member 2
stayed with their estimate until the last round, then lowered their estimate closer to the
mean and median. Member 3 changed their estimate immediately and then stuck with it
through the remaining rounds. Overall, the standard deviation did decrease, but not as
much as the average estimate for question three.
Table 4.6: Question Three - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
14 to 45
30 to 45
30 to 45
30 to 45

Member 1,2,3,4
30,40,14,45
30,40,30,45
30,40,30,45
30,35,30,45

Mean
32.25
36.25
36.25
35

Median
35
35
35
32.5

Std Deviation
13.67174
7.5
7.5
7.07106

4.6 Question Four
What is your estimate of the cost for each person on each TDY?
Question four provides the final number for the travel portion of the cost of
oversight formula. By multiplying the number from questions two, three, and four, an
estimate for the cost of travel in the oversight process can be obtained. Question four
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will provide an actual dollar figure estimate for the cost of one TDY for one person on a
team. Results are presented in the same format as previous questions.
4.6.1 Question Four - Low Estimate
Question four, low estimate showed a pattern of a constantly decreasing standard
deviation. The decrease in the standard deviation was significant in coming to an almost
full consensus on the low estimate. All panel members made some changes in their
estimate at one point or another, which can be seen below in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Question Four - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
500 to 1000
700 to 1000
700 to 750
700 to 750

Member 1,2,3,4
$1000/ 500/ 700/ 850
$1000/ 750/ 700/ 700
$750/ 750/ 700/ 700
$750/ 750/ 725/ 700

Mean
762.5
787.5
725
731.25

Median
775
725
725
737.5

Std Deviation
213.6009
143.61407
28.86751
23.93567

4.6.2 Question Four - Average Estimate
Results, listed in Table 4.8, show the initial range and standard deviation were
quite large for the first round. The initial assumption was that this would decrease
significantly over the next rounds. Members 1 and 4 set their initial estimates and did not
change through the rounds, but members 2 and 3 did change their estimates. Member 3
changed their estimate once and left it alone and member 2 changed the estimate three
out of four rounds. Although the standard deviation did not decrease to an actual number
that most would consider small, it did decrease by over 50 percent, which could be
considered significant, given the data set to analyze.
Table 4.8: Question Four - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
800 to 2000
1200 to 1800
1200 to 1800
1200 to 1800

Member 1,2,3,4
$1800/ 800/ 2000/ 1200
$1800/ 1200/ 1500/ 1200
$1800/ 1300/ 1500/ 1200
$1800/ 1300/ 1500/ 1200
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Mean
1450
1425
1450
1450

Median
1500
1350
1400
1400

Std Deviation
550.75705
287.22813
264.57513
264.57513

4.6.3 Question Four - High Estimate
The high estimate for question four had a large range, seen in Table 4.9, and
similar to the average estimate, a large standard deviation. Member 1 stood fast in their
estimate and never changed the high estimate. Member 2 changed their estimate in
rounds two and four while members 3 and 4 only changed their estimates in round two
and then left them alone. The standard deviation decreased to 32 percent of the original
standard deviation.
Table 4.9: Question Four - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
1000 to 5000
2200 to 3600
2200 to 3600
1200 to 1800

Member 1,2,3,4
$3600/ 1000/ 5000/ 2000
$3600/ 2800/ 3000/ 2200
$3600/ 2800/ 3000/ 2200
$3600/ 2900/ 3000/ 2200

Mean
2900
2900
2900
2925

Median
2800
2900
2900
2950

Std Deviation
1762.5739
577.35027
577.35027
573.73048

4.7 Travel Computation
When taking each value provide by each panel member and multiplying, as stated
in the first section of our algorithm, the calculation becomes the first section in the cost of
oversight estimate for the NSSAP 03-01 oversight process. These amounts are seen in
Table 4.10. The range, from low to high, are $9,750 to $913,000.

Table 4.10: Total Travel Estimate for Cost of Oversight for One KDP
Member
1
2
3
4

Travel-Low
$9,750
$30,000
$10,875
$35,000

Travel-Average
$144,000
$195,000
$150,000
$144,000

Travel-High
$648,000
$913,500
$630,000
$792,000

4.8 Question Five
Estimate how many hours are spent on support for the DSAB approval process
per person, not including TDY travel time, but actual job performance while
TDY or at home base. (slide prep, meeting prep, etc)
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In question five, a new segment of the cost of oversight algorithm is started.
Question five is the beginning of the personnel portion of the estimate. With question
five, the goal is to find the number of hours personnel put in directly towards the DSAB
process.
4.8.1 Question Five - Low Estimate
The results, shown in Table 4.11, started off with another large range. In the
round two, all members, but member 4, changed their estimates. Members 1 and 2 cut
their estimates by half and member 3 raised theirs 450 percent. Member 4 made an
estimate and stayed with that estimate. Since the answers did not change in round three,
it was considered closed and consensus reached. It was assumed that no other changes
were made which would cause any other member to change their answer.
Table 4.11: Question Five - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
10 to 120
44 to 80
44 to 80
Consensus

Member 1,2,3,4
120,160,10,44
60,80,45,44
60,80,45,44
Reached

Mean
83.5
57.25
57.25

Median
82
52.5
52.5

Std Deviation
68.67071
16.83993
16.83993

4.8.2 Question Five - Average Estimate
In Table 4.12, the average estimates have almost the same pattern as the low
estimate for question five. This time, the only members to change any responses were
members 2 and 3 and they only changed the estimates initially. Consensus was reached
due to the similar circumstances stated in the low estimate portion of question five.
Table 4.12: Question Five - Average Estimate By Round
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Round
1
2
3
4

Range
20 to 200
90 to 180
90 to 180
Consensus

Member 1,2,3,4
180,200,20,120
180,120,90,120
180,120,90,120
Reached

Mean
130
127.5
127.5

Median
150
120
120

Std Deviation
80.82903
37.74917
37.749174

4.8.3 Question Five - High Estimate
Table 4.13 below shows the results for the high estimates. Once again these
showed the similar pattern as the earlier portions of question five. The range decreased
by over half and the standard deviation decreased by over half. The members did not
show any movement in changing estimates from round two to round three, so it was
determined that consensus was reached for the high estimate of question five.
Table 4.13: Question Five - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
45 to 300
135 to 240
135 to 240
Consensus

Member 1,2,3,4
240,300,45,200
240,160,135,200
240,160,135,200
Reached

Mean
196.25
183.75
183.75

Median
220
180
180

Std Deviation
108.88641
46.07512
46.07512

4.9 Question Six
Estimate how many people are normally involved with the preparation process.
Question six places an actual number of personnel into the second portion of the
algorithm for cost of oversight. The number of personnel involved in the preparation
process included those creating slides, preparing briefings, and supporting the IPA. The
results are given in similar format as previous data collected.
4.9.1 Question Six - Low Estimate
The low estimate, seen in Table 4.14, was a volatile subject. Almost every
respondent changed their estimate, except member 4, who chose nine and stuck with that
estimate throughout. The rest of the panel agreed with member 4 and came closer and
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closer to that estimate. The standard deviation was reduced to less than one, which is
considered a close consensus.
Table 4.14: Question Six - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
4 to 40
5 to 10
7 to 10
9 to 10

Member 1,2,3,4
4,40,3,9
9,10,5,9
9,10,7,9
9,10,10,9

Mean
14
8.25
8.75
9.5

Median
6.5
9
9
9.5

Std Deviation
17.53062
2.21735
1.2583
0.57735

4.9.2 Question Six - Average Estimate
The average estimate, located in Table 4.15, showed less movement than other
estimates. The mean and the median stayed constant while the standard deviation moved
in round two. After round two, no other movement was made and the average estimate
was not changed. Due to the change in the low estimate, however, question six remained
open until the end of round four.
Table 4.15: Question Six - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
5 to 50
20 to 35
20 to 35
20 to 35

Member 1,2,3,4
20,50,5,35
20,30,25,35
20,30,25,35
20,30,25,35

Mean
27.5
27.5
27.5
27.5

Median
27.5
27.5
27.5
27.5

Std Deviation
19.36491
6.45497
6.45497
6.45497

4.9.3 Question Six - High Estimate
The high estimate, seen below in Table 4.16, is rather stable from the start of
round one through the end of round four. There were still changes made to the estimates
by all panel members. Members 1 and 4 changed their estimates initially and then never
changed the estimate again. Member 2 changed their estimate in round two and then
reduced the estimate in round 4. Member 3 increased their estimate during each round.
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In the final round the mean and median were stable and the standard deviation was
reduced significantly from the initial round.
Table 4.16: Question Six - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
12 to 76
40 to 55
40 to 55
40 to 50

Member 1,2,3,4
30,70,12,76
40,55,40,50
40,55,42,50
40,50,45,50

Mean
47
46.25
46.75
46.25

Median
50
45
46
47.5

Std Deviation
31.00537
7.5
6.99404
4.78713

4.10 Question Seven
Estimate the cost per hour for each person involved in the process.
Question Seven provides the last portion of the personnel cost estimate for the
total cost of oversight. With the estimates provided in question seven, multiplied by the
estimates given in questions five and six, the estimated forecast for the cost of personnel
in the oversight process is projected.
4.10.1 Question Seven - Low Estimate
In Table 4.17, the low estimates are provided. The estimates changed in the first
three rounds and remained unchanged for the final round. The standard deviation was
reduced and the median remained constant after round two. Member 1 and 4 remained
with their initial estimate during all four rounds. Member 2 changed their estimate in
round two and member 3 changed their estimate in rounds one, two and three.
Table 4.17: Question Seven - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
32 to 100
32 to 75
32 to 50
32 to 50

Member 1,2,3,4
$32,$40,$100,$50
$32,$50,$75,$50
$32,$50,$50,$50
$32,$50,$50,$50

Mean
55.5
51.75
45.5
45.5

4.10.2 Question Seven - Average Estimate
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Median
45
50
50
50

Std Deviation
30.56686
17.67059
9
9

Question seven’s estimates, located in Table 4.18, came to a consensus in round
three with a minimized standard deviation of 2.5. It was continued due to the potential
decrease in round four. Member 4 was the only member who maintained a constant
estimate while other members appeared to converge to member 4’s estimate. The range
went from eighty to five in three rounds.
Table 4.18: Question Seven - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
50 to 130
60 to 100
70 to 75
70 to 75

Member 1,2,3,4
$60,$50,$130,$75
$60,$70,$100,$75
$75,$70,$75,$75
$75,$70,$75,$75

Mean
78.75
76.25
73.75
73.75

Median
67.5
72.5
75
75

Std Deviation
35.67795
17.01714
2.5
2.5

4.10.3 Question Seven - High Estimate
The high estimate for question seven, seen in Table 4.19, did not change as much
s the average estimates. Although the standard deviation did not change a considerable
amount, it was still decreased by 50 percent and the range was decreased by from 190 to
100. Member 1 stayed with their original estimate during all four rounds and was the
highest. Member 2 increased their estimate during all four rounds and members 3 and 4
made minor changes initially.
Table 4.19: Question Seven - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
60 to 250
100 to 250
130 to 250
150 to 250

Member 1,2,3,4
$250,$60,$200,$150
$250,$100,$200,$175
$250,$130,$190,$175
$250,$150,$190,$175

Mean
165
181.25
186.25
191.25

Median
175
187.5
182.5
182.5

Std Deviation
81.03497
62.5
49.56056
42.5

4.11 Personnel Cost Computation
Calculating questions five, six, and seven together provide the cost estimate for
the total personnel costs for one KDP in a program. Seen below in Table 4.20, the
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figures are ranging from $17,280 to $2,400,000 for personnel costs in the NSSAP 03-01
oversight process.
Table 4.20: Total Personnel Estimate for Cost of Oversight for One KDP
Member
1
2
3
4

Personnel-Low
$17,280
$40,000
$22,500
$19,800

Personnel-Avg
$115,200
$180,000
$112,500
$210,000

Personnel-High
$2,400,000
$1,200,000
$1,154,250
$1,750,000

4.12 Question Eight
Estimate how many meetings are normally held from the PEO preparation,
through DSAB approval. (this includes meetings TDY or TDY prep meetings).

Question eight provides insight on how meetings are included into the oversight
process. By multiplying questions eight, nine, and ten, we will get an idea of truly what
part meetings play in the cost of oversight. Question eight deals specifically with the
number of meetings that are held during one KDP in a program. The results are listed in
the following three paragraphs.

4.12.1 Question Eight - Low Estimate
The low estimate, in Table 4.21, was immediately moved in round two and then
remained constant until survey completion. The standard deviation showed significant
reduction, even for only being changed once. The range was decreased from twenty to
three and members 1 and 4 were the pace setters, once again, by creating an estimate and
staying with that estimate throughout all four rounds.
Table 4.21: Question Eight - Low Estimate By Round
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Round
1
2
3
4

Range
5 to 25
7 to 10
7 to 10
7 to 10

Member 1,2,3,4
7,25,5,8
7,10,7,8
7,10,7,8
7,10,7,8

Mean
11.25
8
8
8

Median
7.5
7.5
7.5
7.5

Std Deviation
9.25112
1.41421
1.41421
1.41421

4.12.2 Question Eight - Average Estimate
The average estimate, seen below in Table 4.22, fell mostly in between 15 and 16.
The standard deviation was decreased to 25 percent of the original value. The response
range was decreased from twenty-seven to seven, with some hesitation. The round three
values were not changed and almost considered a consensus, but in round four, member 3
changed their estimate to approach the mean and median of the other respondents.
Table 4.22: Question Eight - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
8 to 35
12 to 20
12 to 20
13 to 20

Member 1,2,3,4
8,35,10,13
16,20,12,13
16,20,12,13
16,20,14,13

Mean
16.5
15.25
15.25
15.75

Median
11.5
14.5
14.5
15

Std Deviation
12.50333
3.59397
3.59397
3.09569

4.12.3 Question Eight - High Estimate
The high estimate for question eight, seen in Table 4.23, remained a moving
target during all four rounds. The range began at 35 and decreased to 13 at the end of
round four. The standard deviation was decreased to approximately 30 percent of the
original value. Member 4 stayed with their original estimate during all four rounds and
members 2 and 3 changed their estimates to match closer with the mean and median for
each round.
Table 4.23: Question Eight - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
15 to 50
15 to 35
15 to 30
15 to 28

Member 1,2,3,4
16,50,20,15
25,35,22,15
25,30,23,15
25,28,25,15

Mean
25.25
24.25
23
23.25
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Median
18
23.5
23.5
25

Std Deviation
16.64081
8.3016
6.27162
5.6789

4.13 Question Nine
What do you estimate as the length, in hours, for each meeting?
Question nine provides a length for each meeting, which will be multiplied by the
number of meetings provided in question eight and the cost per hour for each person,
provided in question ten. Question nine was an estimate that came in with relatively low
standard deviations for each estimate, but overall, was not significantly volatile from one
round to the next. Results are provided in the following three sub-paragraphs.
4.13.1 Question Nine - Low Estimate
The low estimate in question nine, located in Table 4.24, contained only one
change by one respondent in all four rounds. Member 2 changed their answer in the
second round and no other changes were made. Even with the minor change in the
estimate by member 2, the data set remained close with a low standard deviation and a
comparatively close range.

Table 4.24: Question Nine - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
.25 to 4
.25 to 2
.25 to 2
.25 to 2

Member 1,2,3,4
.25,4,1,.3
.25,2,1,.3
.25,2,1,.3
.25,2,1,.3

Mean
1.3875
0.8875
0.8875
0.8875

Median
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65

Std Deviation
1.775
0.81687
0.81687
0.81687

4.13.2 Question Nine - Average Estimate
The average estimate for question nine, listed in Table 4.25, had a similar pattern
to the low estimate. Members 1 and 4 provided an estimate and never changed their
initial estimate. Member 2 changed their initial estimate in the second round and never
changed the estimate in the following rounds. Member 3 changed the estimate in rounds
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2 and 4. In the last round of the survey, although the range and standard deviation did not
noticeably change, almost all members came to an agreement on an estimate.
Table 4.25: Question Nine - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
2 to 6
2.5 to 4
2.5 to 4
2.5 to 4

Member 1,2,3,4
4,6,2,2.5
4,4,3,2.5
4,4,3,2.5
4,4,4,2.5

Mean
3.625
3.375
3.375
3.625

Median
3.25
3.5
3.5
4

Std Deviation
1.79698
0.75
0.75
0.75

4.13.3 Question Nine - High Estimate
The high estimate for question nine, located in Table 4.26 below, never changed
in range and the change in standard deviation was very minuscule. There was an initial
close consensus in the first round and slowly spread out during all four rounds. It was
interesting that, even though three out of four estimated eight on the first round, by the
end of round four, each member had a different estimate. The standard deviation did
decrease due to the closer interval to the mean in the data set.

Table 4.26: Question Nine - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
8 to 12
8 to 12
8 to 12
8 to 12

Member 1,2,3,4
12,8,8,8
12,8,8,8
12,9,8,8
12,9,10,8

Mean
9
9
9.25
9.75

Median
8
8
8.5
9.5

Std Deviation
2
2
1.89296
1.70782

4.14 Question Ten
What is the cost per hour of each person involved in the meetings?
Question ten provided the cost per person to include in the final portion of the
cost of oversight estimate for meetings conducted for a KDP. The results of question ten
mirrored the results of question seven, due to both dealing with the cost of personnel per
hour. The results will still be provided separately due to future discussion on the cost of
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oversight and the analysis portion of the thesis. The estimates will be provided in the
same format as previous questions.
4.14.1 Question Ten - Low Estimate
Question ten’s low estimate, listed in Table 4.27, moved significantly in relation
to the range and standard deviation. Member 3 was the only respondent to change their
estimate while the other three members left their estimate the same from round one
throughout the whole survey.
Table 4.27: Question Ten - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
32 to 100
32 to 75
32 to 50
32 to 50

Member 1,2,3,4
$32,$40,$100,$50
$32,$40,$75,$50
$32,$40,$50,$50
$32,$40,$45,$50

Mean
55.5
49.25
43
41.75

Median
45
45
45
42.5

Std Deviation
30.56686
18.67931
8.71779
7.67571

4.14.2 Question Ten - Average Estimate
The average estimate, seen in Table 4.28, initially had a large range of 70 and a
relatively large standard deviation which was half of the range. The standard deviation
was eventually reduced by round three to 7.5 and most members came to a consensus
with one number. Member 2 changed their estimate in the second round and left the
estimate the same while member 3 changed their estimate twice.
Table 4.28: Question Ten - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
60 to 130
60 to 100
60 to 75
60 to 75

Member 1,2,3,4
$60,$50,$130,$75
$60,$60,$100,$75
$75,$60,$75,$75
$75,$60,$75,$75

Mean
78.75
73.75
71.25
71.25

4.14.3 Question Ten - High Estimate
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Median
67.5
67.5
75
75

Std Deviation
35.67795
18.87458
7.5
7.5

The high estimate, listed in Table 4.29, was an estimate that never really came to
a consensus. Member 1 chose one number and it was the highest estimate in the
responses. The other members changed their estimates, at least once, which approached
the mean and median of the most current round. The standard deviation did reduce by
almost half and the data range was also reduced by almost half.
Table 4.29: Question Ten - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
60 to 250
100 to 250
130 to 250
150 to 250

Member 1,2,3,4
$250, $60,$250,$150
$250,$100, $200, $250
$250,$130,$200,$175
$250,$150,$150,$175

Mean
177.5
181.25
188.75
181.25

Median
200
187.5
187.5
162.5

Std Deviation
91.42392
62.5
50.06246
47.32423

4.15 Meeting Cost Computation
Combining questions eight, nine, and ten provide the total estimated cost of
meetings in the NSSAP 03-01 oversight process. This calculation is located in Table
4.30, seen below. The costs for meetings range from only $56 to $75,000 for one person
for each KDP in one program.
Table 4.30: Meeting Estimate for Cost of Oversight for One Person
Member
1
2
3
4

Meetings-Low
$56
$800
$315
$120

Meetings-Avg
$4,800
$4,800
$1,200
$2,438

Meetings-High
$75,000
$37,800
$37,500
$21,000

The numbers provided above only give the cost for one person going to meetings.
With these calculations, another computation is needed and that requires the actual
number of people attending the meetings. These were provided in an additional question
at the end of the Delphi to capture a basic estimate. The results are located in Table 4.31.
Table 4.31: Total Number of Members Present at Meetings
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Member #
1
2
3
4

Low
8
5
8
25

Avg
25
10
25
55

High
75
45
75
80

With this additional information, the number of people attending the meeting is
multiplied with the total cost of meetings to provide us with a true cost of meetings in the
oversight process under the NSSAP 03-01 guidelines. These costs are seen in Table 4.32
and range from $448 to $5,625,000.
Table 4.32: Total Cost of Meetings in Oversight Process
MEMBER
1
2
3
4

Meeting-LOW
$448.00
$4,000.00
$2,520.00
$3,000.00

Meeting-AVG
$120,000.00
$48,000.00
$105,000.00
$134,062.50

Meeting-HIGH
$5,625,000.00
$1,701,000.00
$2,812,500.00
$1,680,000.00

4.16 Summary of Results
The goal of the Delphi Method was to complete at least four rounds while trying
to reach consensus. The objectives were clear for how consensus would be determined.
The rule was met for all 10 questions provided in the survey and all objectives for the
data collection portion were met.
The focus now turns to answering the first research question stated in Chapter 3.
This question is to find the cost of oversight for one program’s cost of oversight under the
NSSAP 03-01 directives. By using the algorithm provided the total amounts are seen
below in Table 4.33. The forecasted range for the cost of oversight for one program in
one KDP ranges from $27,478 to $8,673,000. These points represent the optimistic and
pessimistic views of the total cost of oversight.
Table 4.33: Total Cost of Oversight for One KDP in One Program
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Key Decision Point (KDP)
MEMBER
1
2
3
4

MDP Low
$27,478.00
$74,000.00
$35,895.00
$57,800.00

MDP Avg
$534,000.00
$495,000.00
$423,750.00
$593,062.50

MDP High
$8,673,000.00
$3,814,500.00
$4,596,750.00
$4,222,000.00

Since Table 4.33 shows the cost for only one KDP, by using one of the
assumptions stated in Chapter 3, these numbers are simply multiplied by three to provide
a forecast for the total cost of oversight for a program operating within the guidelines of
the NSSAP 03-01. These are shown below in Table 4.34. The range is $82,434 to
$26,019,000.

Table 4.34: Total Cost of Oversight for One Program
Total Program
MEMBER
1
2
3
4

Program Low
$82,434.00
$222,000.00
$107,685.00
$173,400.00

Program Avg
$1,602,000.00
$1,485,000.00
$1,271,250.00
$1,779,187.50

Program High
$26,019,000.00
$11,443,500.00
$13,790,250.00
$12,666,000.00

Now that each member’s estimates have been provided, the information will be
placed in statistical software as a database in order to answer the final two research
questions. Each respondent will have their estimates entered for each question. This will
be compared with other respondents from the theses research conducted by Neal (32) and
Rousseau (40). When comparing all of the estimates together, an analysis of variance test
will be conducted by question, by type of regulatory guidance policy programs typically
fall under. (ie, NSSAP 03-01, DoDD 5000, or C3I)
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Once this analysis has been completed, the results and analysis will be presented
in Chapter 5 to see if there truly is a difference in the cost of oversight among programs.
Along with the comparative analysis, a simulation will be conducted with Monte Carlo
simulation techniques. By using the estimates provided by the expert panel members, the
additional 10,000 iterations will provide a more accurate picture of the cost of oversight
of a program under the NSSAP 03-01.
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5.0 Analysis
5.1 Overview
The goal of Chapter 5 is to compare the results of the final round of Delphi
surveys for each of the acquisition disciplines examined. The first section will contain a
question by question statistical comparison of responses. The comparisons are conducted
in the manner discussed in the methodology described in Chapter 3. Question one will
contain only a qualitative discussion on the cost drivers identified, but will list all drivers
to complete the goal of research question three. Questions two through ten are
quantitatively compared with a significance level of .05 for testing the null hypothesis of
finding any statistical differences in the mean, for the forecast data collected. Each
question will include a discussion on where the differences are and discuss some of the
similarities among the different disciplines, answering research question two.
The final section will conclude the analysis with the recommendation for future
oversight transformation efforts as well as provide any insight, gained from this research,
as to whether the goal of transformation realized by the Commission on Space has been
achieved. Finally, any future research efforts that could continue to build on this thesis
will be provided to assist in defining the cost of oversight in MDAPs in the future
5.2 Question One
From the Program Executive Officer (PEO) recommendation, to the Defense
Systems Acquisition Board (DSAB) approval (including the entire Integrated
Program Assesment (IPA) process), what are the five major cost drivers in the
oversight process?

The results for all three oversight processes are listed in Table 5.1 below. DoDD
5000 and C3I drivers focused mainly on issues dealing with the program, itself, not so
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much on the oversight process. This seems to be due to the oversight process for both are
centralized and all aspects for the program are centrally driven and approved. Notice that
for the NSSAP 03-01 drivers, they are issues dealing more with lower level problems,
such as TDYs, personnel out of the program supporting other programs, or IPAs. The
hypothesis gained from this perspective is that when a program is under a decentralized
oversight process, the external drivers, such as requirements and other issues are not as
big of focus as when a program is in a centralized form of oversight. Although C3I is a
new model for oversight, it is still under the guidelines of the basic DoDD 5000 structure
and the drivers are noticeably similar. This display then answers research question three
and identifies the main cost drivers, as seen by those in the actual programs regulated.
Table 5.1: Cost Drivers for Oversight Processes
D riv e rs P icke d --D oD D 50 00
P rog ram is M u lti-Serv ic e
W he th er C o m p le te ly ne w sys te m or jus t bloc k u pg ra de
N um b er o f T ec hn olog ies go in g into the sys te m
N um b er o f S ys tem s the S ys tem m u s t inte ra c t w ith
M iles to ne B (re qu ire s m o st do c um e nts ; 3 0 to b e ge ne rated for rev ie w )

R an k
1
2
3
4
5

Drivers Picked--Space
T im e away from prim ary responsibilities while supporting IPA at expense of rest of program
T DY from the program office to IPA or IPA folks to program office
IPA Personnel Costs (Program Evaluation)
Salaries of IPA core m em bers and "gray beard" m em bers who are not governm ent em ployees
IPA Travel/PerDiem costs (Team and support personnel)
Drivers Picked--C3I
Lack of functional requirem ents that are clearly defined and understood
Negotiating viewpoints of the various stakeholders…acq strategy re-do
T he serial process of docum ent approval by the several echelons of oversight
T he lack of established architectures and the resulting need for unique C4ISP efforts
Changing oversight requirem ents;the way we did things previously not work now due to
changing personalities, policy etc.--requires clim bing the learning curve again

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
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5.3 Question Two
From the PEO recommendation, to the DSAB approval of the KDP, use your
professional judgment and estimate how many TDYs are taken by one person to
get one program through one Key Decision Point (KDP)/Integrated Program
Assessment (IPA) process?
When comparing question two, there were statistical differences for all three
oversight processes when comparing C3I and DoDD 5000 with Space oversight. Seen in
Table 5.2, at all levels of the forecasts, not one of the estimates were statistically similar
to Space oversight under the NSSAP 03-01. When looking at the data, Space was always
lower in the estimates for the number of TDYs taken by a person in the program. With
this comparison, it is shown that, under NSSAP 03-01, it is perceived that the IPA
process actually requires fewer TDYs for each person for each KDP.
Table 5.2: ANOVA for Question Two
Question 2
p-Values (.05 significance level)
COMPARISON
LOW
AVG
HIGH
Space vs C3I
0.0004
0.0038
0.0075
Space vs 5000
0.0001
0.0005
0.0004

5.4 Question Three
Estimate how many people normally go TDY throughout the KDP/IPA process.

In question three, there were not any significant statistical differences when
looking for the number of people that actually go TDY in the KDP/IPA process. Table
5.3 shows that, among the different oversight processes, there aren’t any differences in
the perception that the number of people going TDY has decreased. This is especially
interesting when reviewing the C3I process. The expectation would be that, since it is a
mostly virtual process, the actual number of people going TDY would decrease, however,
when looking at the raw data, it is slightly lower, than DoDD 5000 and Space, but not
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significant enough to have a statistical difference. The shaded areas on each table
represents areas that have no statistical difference.
Table 5.3: ANOVA for Question Three
Question 3
p-Values (.05 significance level)
COMPARISON
LOW
AVG
HIGH
Space vs C3I
0.0811
0.1071
0.1345
Space vs 5000
0.4934
0.3418
0.2323
Fail to reject

5.5 Question Four
What is your estimate of the cost for each person on each TDY?
In trying to capture the cost for each person on each TDY, the results were varied
for the different oversight process comparisons. Seen in Table 5.4, the low estimate
showed statistical significance in the difference in forecasts while the average showed
very little differences, although the average for space and C3I were borderline. For the
low estimate, C3Is costs were actually a bit higher than the estimates for space oversight.
Comparing the low estimates with the DoDD 5000, the estimates are even lower. The
only guess could be the costs increase because the length of the TDY is actually longer,
due to the IPA process. This would cause the costs to increase, but the actual number of
TDYs, shown above in Table 5.2, to remain lower.
The average costs were statistically similar. The high estimates for cost of each TDY
was only different between DoDD 5000 and Space oversight. Again, based on the initial
hypothesis that the IPA TDYs are longer, the costs are higher. DoDD 5000 estimates
came in actually lower than the Space NSSAP 03-01 estimates.

Table 5.4: ANOVA for Question Four
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Question 4
p-Values (.05 significance level)
COMPARISON
LOW
AVG
HIGH
Space vs C3I
0.0008
0.0582
0.1143
Space vs 5000
0.043
0.3136
0.0087

5.6 Travel Computation
Looking at all data points combined for all three theses, Table 5.5 displays the
ranges forecasted for the total combinations of the cost of travel in the different oversight
processes. Although in the earlier comparisons of travel estimates, space oversight was
higher in cost per TDY, the overall range of total costs is lower. This again is
hypothesized that due to the IPA process, the cost of each TDY is increased, but the total
number of TDYs are decreased, resulting in an overall decrease in total TDY costs. This
seems to hold true when actually comparing the total cost for travel among the oversight
processes.
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Table 5.5: Travel Cost Computations
5000 - Travel
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
5
MEAN
STD DEV
Space
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV
C3I - Travel
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Travel-LOW
Travel-AVG
Travel-HIGH
$336,000.00 $1,152,000.00 $3,840,000.00
$576,000.00 $1,728,000.00 $6,480,000.00
$28,800.00
$192,000.00
$720,000.00
$12,000.00
$100,000.00 $1,250,000.00
$18,000.00
$180,000.00
$720,000.00
$194,160.00
$670,400.00 $2,602,000.00
$253,711.90
$732,320.15 $2,524,048.34

Travel-LOW
Travel-AVG
Travel-HIGH
$9,750.00
$144,000.00
$648,000.00
$30,000.00
$195,000.00
$913,500.00
$10,875.00
$150,000.00
$630,000.00
$35,000.00
$144,000.00
$792,000.00
$21,406.25
$158,250.00
$745,875.00
$12,979.70
$24,662.72
$133,206.84

Travel-LOW
Travel-AVG
Travel-HIGH
$36,000.00
$400,000.00 $3,000,000.00
$42,000.00
$94,500.00
$432,000.00
$60,000.00
$400,000.00 $2,100,000.00
$240,000.00 $1,200,000.00 $4,800,000.00
$94,500.00
$523,625.00 $2,583,000.00
$97,534.61
$473,355.99 $1,821,086.49

5.7 Question Five
Estimate how many hours are spent on support for the DSAB approval process
per person, not including TDY travel time, but actual job performance while
TDY or at home base. (slide prep, meeting prep, etc)

Question five results, located in Table 5.6, shows that there were statistical
differences across every aspect for each estimate level. Comparing the C3I estimates,
due to the virtual nature inherent in the process, the hours for preparation are lower than
space oversight. This is assumed to be due to the availability of all documents for
oversight on the internet or website. For space oversight, this is not the case and the
estimates for low, average, and high are all higher for space than for C3I.
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When comparing with DoDD 5000, the case is an extreme opposite. DoDD 5000
process is significantly higher than space oversight. This is assumed to be due to the
number of meetings that are required between each level of approval, which is not in the
IPA process for space oversight under the direction for the NSSAP 03-01. This is a very
significant question that shows how much of an influence the virtual process in C3I can
have if possibly introduced in other programs.
Table 5.6: ANOVA for Question Five
p-Values (.05 significance level)
Question 5
COMPARISON
LOW
AVG
HIGH
Space vs C3I
0.0019
0.0012
0.0007
Space vs 5000
0.0071
0.001
0.0005

5.8 Question Six
Estimate how many people are normally involved with the preparation process.
This comparison was split exactly down the center, by oversight process. Shown
in Table 5.7, the difference between space and C3I is once again statistically different in
all three estimates. However, there are no statistical differences between space and the
DoDD 5000 oversight processes. When looking at the raw data, C3I is definitely lower
than the other oversight processes when reviewing the number of people involved in the
preparation process. Once again, the assumption is based on the availability of the
information to everyone involved in real-time and the ability to view that information
whenever possible.
Comparing space to DoDD 5000, they are statistically similar due to the
necessary meeting preparation for IPA or DAB approval. Although the DoDD 5000
oversight process has an increased number of meetings, the IPA is assumed to still have
those meetings, but only in a set timeframe during the IPA. By showing this information,
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it is hypothesized that the information is still being gathered and prepared in similar
manners under DoDD 5000 and the NSSAP 03-01 processes, while C3I enables the realtime review for the approval process, decreasing the number of people needed to prepare
for the approval process.
Table 5.7: ANOVA for Question Six
p-Values (.05 significance level)
Question 6
COMPARISON
LOW
AVG
HIGH
Space vs C3I
0.0001
0.002
0.0001
Space vs 5000
0.2225
0.2213
0.1415

5.9 Question Seven
Estimate the cost per hour for each person involved in the process.
Question seven was varied among the three different processes, which is seen
below in Table 5.8. Looking at the low estimate first, the level for Space compared with
C3I is statistically different. But when compared with the DoDD 5000, there isn’t a
difference. This is again true for the average estimate. But for the high estimate, the two
swap and have statistical differences in different order.
The data reviewed shows that the estimate for the C3I process was higher in the
low and average estimates when compared with space and the high estimate was very
similar. When reviewing the DoDD 5000 data, the reverse is true. No assumption can be
made as to why this occurs, but the statistical differences from the Delphi processes
remain.

Table 5.8: ANOVA for Question Seven
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Question 7
COMPARISON
Space vs C3I
Space vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.003
0.0001
0.2178
0.6153
0.0746
0.0018

5.10 Personnel Cost Computation
When reviewing the total estimates provided by all three types of oversight, the
comparison of total costs for personnel show large value differences. Shown in Table
5.9, the C3I portion is significantly smaller than the NSSAP or DoDD 5000 oversight
processes. DoDD 5000 oversight process has the largest range for all three. Ranging
from $120,000 to over $24M, personnel costs create a large portion for the cost of
oversight in programs under the centralized control of DoDD 5000. Space is estimated
lower at $17,280 to $2.4M, but doesn’t compare with the C3I estimates of $4,200 to just
over $144,000. This shows that using the C3I approach could provide some potential
cost savings in the oversight process by placing items in a virtual environment and
allowing those who have access the ability to view at their leisure.
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Table 5.9: Personnel Cost Computation
5000 - Personnel
MEMBER
Person-LOW
Person-AVG
1 $2,373,600.00 $7,654,400.00
2 $2,250,000.00 $7,312,500.00
3
$182,320.00
$894,300.00
4
$120,000.00 $1,200,000.00
5
$215,000.00
$805,000.00
$1,028,184.00 $3,573,240.00
MEAN
STD DEV
$1,173,086.83 $3,574,565.45

Person-HIGH
$14,664,000.00
$22,440,000.00
$3,151,260.00
$7,200,000.00
$2,820,000.00
$10,055,052.00
$8,408,165.41

Space Personnel
MEMBER
Person-LOW
Person-AVG
Person-HIGH
1
$17,280.00
$270,000.00 $2,400,000.00
2
$40,000.00
$252,000.00 $1,200,000.00
3
$22,500.00
$168,750.00 $1,154,250.00
4
$19,800.00
$315,000.00 $1,750,000.00
$24,895.00
$251,437.50 $1,626,062.50
MEAN
$10,293.11
$61,161.80
$582,659.43
STD DEV
C3I - Personnel
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Person-LOW
Person-AVG
Person-HIGH
$4,200.00
$25,500.00
$135,000.00
$7,200.00
$25,200.00
$129,600.00
$7,200.00
$30,000.00
$90,000.00
$7,680.00
$33,600.00
$144,000.00
$6,570.00
$28,575.00
$124,650.00
$1,596.12
$4,005.31
$23,851.42

5.11 Question Eight
Estimate how many meetings are normally held from the PEO preparation,
through DSAB approval. (this includes meetings TDY or TDY prep meetings).

This comparison, located in Table 5.10, found one statistical significance when
comparing the means in the ANOVA test. The low estimate for the comparison of Space
to C3I had a significant statistical difference. Although the other comparisons did not
show any differences at the .05 significance level, there were still some notable
differences when reviewing the main data collected. It was expected that the IPA process
would decrease the number of meetings required, which was the same as expected with
the C3I process. This assumption was true, if one only looked at the data, without any
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statistical testing. Reviewing the data provided in the DoDD 5000 process showed a
numerically larger number of meetings in the range provided, but, did not develop a
difference when tested at the .05 significance. This will result in a larger dollar figure for
the total cost of oversight projected for the DoDD 5000 oversight process, but does not
show a statistical difference when compared with the NSSAP 03-01 process for Space.
Table 5.10: ANOVA for Question Eight
Question 8
COMPARISON
Space vs C3I
Space vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0372
0.1248
0.1306
0.0667
0.1117
0.0768

5.12 Question Nine
What do you estimate as the length, in hours, for each meeting?
The length of meetings was similar in almost all comparisons. The only
difference, seen in Table 5.11, is when comparing Space to DoDD 5000 oversight. This
was due to DoDD 5000 estimates being a little higher than Space. It wasn’t numerically
different, but when comparing the means, there was an apparent statistical difference.
Otherwise, comparing with the rest of the estimates, nothing significant was noted for
question nine.
Table 5.11: ANOVA for Question Nine
Question 9
COMPARISON
Space vs C3I
Space vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0601
1.00
0.6963
0.0346
0.3451
0.4016

5.13 Question Ten
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What is the cost per hour of each person involved in the meetings?

Question ten was varied among the three different processes, which are seen in
Table 5.12. Looking at the low estimate first, the level for Space compared with C3I is
statistically different. But when compared with the DoDD 5000, there isn’t a difference.
This is again true for the average estimate. But for the high estimate, the two swap and
have statistical differences in different order.
The data reviewed shows that the estimate for the C3I process was higher in the
low and average estimates when compared with space and the high estimate was very
similar for all three. When reviewing the DoDD 5000 data, the reverse is true. No
assumption can be made as to why this occurs, but the statistical differences from the
Delphi processes remain and provide similar results as those found in question seven,
which dealt with the similar topic.
Table 5.12: ANOVA for Question Ten
Question 10
COMPARISON
Space vs C3I
Space vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0028
0.0001
0.1008
0.1722
0.2536
0.0049

5.14 Meeting Cost Computation
When comparing the actual cost estimate calculations, an interesting point came
to light. Shown in Table 5.13, the total cost for meetings was actually lowest in the
DoDD 5000 oversight process. More information would be required to make any large
assumptions as to why this had occurred, but the assumption that could be made is due to
the lower cost per hour of personnel contributing in the meeting process. The other areas
for the cost computation come in significantly higher in the DoDD portion when
comparing to the other oversight processes. Because of this one factor, the C3I process
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still looks as though it could statistically come in with a lower cost for meetings than the
DoDD 5000 oversight process. The other interesting occurrence is the high costs that
were calculated in the C3I process. They were associated with one high point that may
have been just an anomaly, but there isn’t sufficient evidence to keep this data point out.
Table 5.13: Meeting Cost Computation
5000 - Meeting
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
5
MEAN
STD DEV
Space - Meeting
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV
C3I - Meeting
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Meeting-LOW Meeting-AVG Meeting-HIGH
$51,600.00
$397,440.00 $3,384,000.00
$34,560.00
$270,000.00 $2,736,000.00
$43,756.80
$260,160.00 $2,075,220.00
$7,200.00
$128,000.00 $1,800,000.00
$15,480.00
$88,320.00
$406,080.00
$30,519.36
$228,784.00 $2,080,260.00
$18,747.83
$123,506.69 $1,119,283.55

Meeting-LOW Meeting-AVG Meeting-HIGH
$448.00
$120,000.00 $5,625,000.00
$4,000.00
$48,000.00 $1,701,000.00
$2,520.00
$105,000.00 $2,812,500.00
$3,000.00
$134,062.50 $1,680,000.00
$2,492.00
$101,765.63 $2,954,625.00
$1,495.64
$37,757.05 $1,857,179.46

Meeting-LOW Meeting-AVG Meeting-HIGH
$33,600.00
$825,000.00 $14,400,000.00
$18,000.00
$112,500.00
$448,000.00
$37,500.00
$300,000.00 $2,208,000.00
$39,600.00
$257,040.00 $3,686,400.00
$32,175.00
$373,635.00 $5,185,600.00
$9,771.51
$311,415.24 $6,283,940.47

5.15 Summary of Results
Overall, the three research questions that were stated as goals for this thesis have
been answered. The total cost of oversight has been calculated as an estimate for the IPA
process under the NSSAP 03-01 oversight process. These results are shown in Table
5.14. The cost drivers for all oversight processes have been identified. Finally, when
compared to the other processes, the research question dealing with any statistical
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differences in the cost of oversight between the different oversight processes has been
answered for all but one combination; total cost comparison.
Table 5.14: Program Cost Computation
5000 - Program
MEMBER

Program Avg
$27,611,520.00
$27,931,500.00
$4,039,380.00
$4,284,000.00
$3,219,960.00
$13,417,272.00
$13,109,978.82

Program High
$65,664,000.00
$94,968,000.00
$17,839,440.00
$30,750,000.00
$11,838,240.00
$44,211,936.00
$35,217,742.48

Space - Program
MEMBER
Program Low Program Avg
1
$82,434.00 $1,602,000.00
2
$222,000.00 $1,485,000.00
3
$107,685.00 $1,271,250.00
4
$173,400.00 $1,779,187.50
MEAN
$146,379.75 $1,534,359.38
STD DEV
$63,337.35
$213,056.30

Program High
$26,019,000.00
$11,443,500.00
$13,790,250.00
$12,666,000.00
$15,979,687.50
$6,761,137.82

1
2
3
4
5
MEAN
STD DEV

C3I - Program
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Program Low
$8,283,600.00
$8,581,680.00
$764,630.40
$417,600.00
$745,440.00
$3,758,590.08
$4,270,333.53

Program Low Program Avg
$221,400.00 $3,751,500.00
$201,600.00
$696,600.00
$314,100.00 $2,190,000.00
$861,840.00 $4,471,920.00
$399,735.00 $2,777,505.00
$311,948.30 $1,682,759.26

Program High
$52,605,000.00
$3,028,800.00
$13,194,000.00
$25,891,200.00
$23,679,750.00
$21,431,855.48

The remaining task is summarizing the results is to see if there are any statistical
differences among the oversight processes for the total cost of one program through the
whole process. The result of this analysis is shown in Table 5.15. The results indicate
that, given our assumptions, there is not a statistical difference among the different
oversight processes. Even with the large ranges in the estimated cost of oversight for the
different processes, they cannot be identified as statistically different.
Table 5.15: ANOVA for Total Cost Comparison
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Total Cost
p-Values (.05 significance level)
COMPARISON
LOW
AVG
HIGH
Space vs C3I
0.1625
0.1932
0.5188
Space vs 5000
0.1393
0.117
0.1629
5000 vs C3I
0.1655
0.1557
0.343

The ranges for each process can be seen in Table 5.16, and the overlap in the
range numbers explains the failure to find significant differences in the oversight
processes. Although not statistically different, the results indicate that each oversight
process has its own cost savings potential.
Table 5.16: Total Cost Ranges by Oversight Process within Range
Process
NSSAP
C3I
5000

Low Range
$82,434 to $222,000
$201,000 to $861,840
$417,600 to $8,581,680

Avg Range
$1,271,000 to $1,779,188
$696,600 to $4,471,920
$3,219,960 to $27,931,500

High Range
$11,443,500 to $26,019,000
$3,028,800 to $52,605,000
$11,838,240 to $94,968,000

5.16 Recommendations
To enhance the oversight process and decrease the potential cost of oversight that
all three oversight processes posses, it is my recommendation that the process of IPA and
C3I be merged into an oversight process that allows approval by an independent board,
but information for those meetings and approval processes should be available over a
virtual process. This could potentially decrease the above costs, listed in Table 5.16 to a
smaller range located in Table 5.17. By combining both processes, the total for potential
savings ranges from $40,000 to a little over $74M per program. These funds could be
realized either directly or indirectly, either in saved man-hours or actual bottom-line
budget savings. Either way, this move has a potential for significant savings to the point
that some sort of live program test or feasibility study should be performed.

Table 5.17: Proposed Combined Oversight Process IPA/C3I
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Process
Proposal

Low Range
$43,194 to $140,040

Avg Range
$652,500 to $1,087,988

High Range
$7,200,000 to $20,046,000

Although the potential does exist for these cost saving areas, it should also be
noted that these changes would require wide structural transformations. The review
process would almost become an additional duty, instead of a full-time position. This
would raise several questions on the best structure for this merged oversight that has been
proposed.
5.17 Follow-on Possibilities
There is a potential for further research in this area. An analysis gathering more
panel members and the inclusion of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agency is a possibility
that could add even more possibilities of cost savings for the Department of Defense and
the oversight of future acquisition processes. It is also important to note that these
experts, from all three panels, were mostly from Air Force sources or backgrounds. A
excellent follow-on would gather data from other services and compare to this study.
Another option is to gather additional data and utilizing simulation to increase the
number of data points collected. By adding the additional data sources, a more effective
range of estimates could be achieved. Another possibility is to see if the costs are
increased or decreased as programs are delayed in the process. Such as when a program
doesn’t pass a KDP and must go through the IPA process again.
This research only scratches the surface on the potential research trying to capture
the cost of oversight. These funds aren’t always budgeted dollars, but do cost the
government in direct or indirect costs. Overall, this research provides the basis for the
identification for potential cost savings in the acquisition environment to help slow the
increasing costs in major weapons system procurement.
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